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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has extended to corporations many of the same
constitutional rights that were originally intended to protect people. One notable
exception, however, is the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compulsory selfincrimination.
“Corporations may not take the Fifth.” There is a long line of cases dating
back to the start of the twentieth century stating—but never directly holding—
that corporations are not protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause.
But the fact that a corporation cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment does not
explain why a person who works for a corporation cannot. As a matter of text,
the Fifth Amendment draws no distinction among the “person[s]” it protects;
everyone is protected—citizens and noncitizens. And the amendment certainly
does not distinguish among “person[s]” depending on where they work or
whether they are employed. Indeed, because the Justices agree, as Justice Scalia
once noted, that “[a]ll the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of
individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears,” an
individual who works for a corporation—for example, the president or
treasurer—is protected by the Fifth Amendment when forced to produce
corporate records that will personally incriminate him.
Yet despite the plain text of the Fifth Amendment, the Court has concluded
otherwise. According to the Justices, a person may be compelled simply because
he is a corporate custodian to perform a testimonial act that will personally
incriminate him. This is because the Court has fused the person with the
corporation. Even the sole shareholder who runs a small business as his alter
ego can be compelled to provide incriminating testimonial evidence due to his
status as a corporate officer.
This Article examines and challenges the Court’s long-standing view that an
individual who works for or joins an organization is not protected by the Fifth
Amendment when compelled to produce incriminating records that ostensibly
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belong to the organization. Known as the “collective entity” or “artificial
entity” rule, the Court has described this rule as having “a lengthy and
distinguished pedigree.” To be sure, the collective entity rule dates back to the
start of the twentieth century. But there is nothing “distinguished,” and little to
celebrate, about the rule. That is, unless one believes that certain persons, based
on employment status or membership in an organization, should be compelled
to give the government incriminating testimony.
The collective entity rule defies the text of the Fifth Amendment, the common
law history of the privilege, and the Court’s Fifth Amendment precedents, which
unmistakably establish that one’s employment status does not diminish the
protection provided by the Fifth Amendment or the ability to invoke it.
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INTRODUCTION
After a majority of the Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission1 ruled that “the Government may not suppress political speech on
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,”2 Justice Stevens’s dissent lectured
his colleagues in the majority that “corporations have no consciences, no beliefs,
no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. . . . [T]hey are not themselves members of
‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”3 As
a matter of text and original intent, Justice Stevens’s understanding of corporate
personhood is probably correct. “There is nothing in the text of the Constitution
that explicitly recognizes corporations or grants them individual rights. In fact,
the word corporation appears nowhere in the Constitution.”4 And according to
one excellent study of the Court’s cases in this area, “the people who wrote and
ratified the Constitution simply never considered whether the Constitution
applied to corporations.”5
Even so, despite the lack of attention paid to corporate personhood during the
Framing era, the Court has extended to corporations many of the same
constitutional rights that were originally intended to protect people.6 One notable
exception, however, is the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compulsory selfincrimination.7 Even after a decision like Citizens United, “[c]orporations may
1

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 365.
3
Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4
ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL
RIGHTS 3 (2018); see also Note, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 106 (1930) (“Nowhere in the
Constitution is the word ‘corporation’ to be found . . . .”).
5
WINKLER, supra note 4, at 3.
6
See id. at 4. There is extensive legal scholarship on the Constitution and corporations.
See generally Robert E. Wagner, Miranda Inc.: Corporations and the Right to Remain Silent,
11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 499 (2017) (discussing impact Citizens United might have on Court’s
denial of Fifth Amendment rights to corporations); Jonathan A. Marcantel, A Unified
Framework to Adjudicate Corporate Constitutional Rights, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 115 (2016)
(navigating inconsistencies in existing corporate constitutional jurisprudence); Zoë Robinson,
Constitutional Personhood, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 605 (2016) (discussing question of
corporate personhood based on recent jurisprudence extending rights of speech and religion
to corporations); Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015) (describing that corporate
personhood argument originated from understanding corporations as associations of people);
Brandon L. Garrett, The Consitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95
(2014) (discussing practical questions for how corporation may bring case in federal court);
Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United and Corporate and Human Crime, 41 STETSON L. REV.
127 (2011) (exploring criminal liability in light of Citizens United). For an insightful analysis
of how the Court’s new and expansive Fourth Amendment doctrine on technological
surveillance could converge with the Court’s expansive view of corporate personhood under
the Constitution to restrict the investigative powers of regulators and prosecutors, see
generally Miriam H. Baer, Law Enforcement’s Lochner, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1667 (2021).
7
The clause states, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2

2021]

LONG OVERDUE

1527

not take the Fifth.”8 There is a long line of cases dating back to the start of the
twentieth century stating—but never directly holding—that corporations are not
protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause.
But the fact that a corporation cannot invoke the Fifth does not explain why a
person who works for a corporation cannot. As a matter of text, the Fifth
Amendment draws no distinction among the “person[s]” it protects; everyone is
protected—citizens and noncitizens. And the amendment certainly does not
distinguish among “person[s]” depending on where they work or whether they
are employed. Indeed, because the Justices agree, as Justice Scalia once noted,
that “[a]ll the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual
men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears[,]”9 an individual
who works for a corporation—for example, the president or treasurer—is
protected by the Fifth Amendment when forced to produce corporate records
that will personally incriminate him.10
Yet despite the plain text of the Fifth Amendment, the Court has concluded
otherwise. According to the Justices, a person may be compelled “simply by
virtue of his status as a corporate custodian, to perform a testimonial act which
will incriminate him personally.”11 Why? Because the Court has fused the
person with the corporation. The Court “has assimilated the position of company
officials to that of the corporation they serve.”12 Even the sole shareholder who
runs a small business as his alter ego can be compelled to provide incriminating
testimonial evidence due to his status as a corporate officer.13
And it is not just corporate officers to whom the Court denies Fifth
Amendment protection. A person who joins a union, a political organization, a
charity, a small business, or a family partnership or other organization cannot
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when subpoenaed to produce

8

Garrett, supra note 6, at 128-29.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 391-92 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
10
Cf. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 50 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting
when Fifth Amendment was adopted, “the term ‘witness’ meant a person who gives or
furnishes evidence . . . . If this is so, a person who responds to a subpoena duces tecum would
be just as much a ‘witness’ as a person who responds to a subpoena ad testificandum”).
11
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 122 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
12
Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1278 (1979) [hereinafter Corporate Crime] (“Thus, a corporate
functionary incriminated by company records he prepared may be compelled to produce
them.”).
13
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 102; see also Maureen Coghlan, Mistaking the Fifth: No Fifth
Amendment Privilege for a One-Person Corporation, FED. PRAC. & PROC. SECTION NEWSL.
(N.J. State Bar Assoc., New Brunswick, N.J.), Sept. 2015, at 3 (discussing In re Grand Jury
Empanelled on May 9, 2014, 786 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2015)); Note, Privilege Against SelfIncrimination Held Inapplicable to Owner of One-Man Corporation, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1118,
1120 (1964) (noting Supreme Court’s disinterest in fact that person claiming corporate
privilege was sole stockholder).
9
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documents that the government claims belong or relate to the functions of the
collective entity.14 As the Court has explained,
when acting as representatives of a collective group, [individuals] cannot
be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to be entitled to
their purely personal privileges. Rather they assume the rights, duties and
privileges of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or
officers and they are bound by its obligations. In their official capacity,
therefore, they have no privilege against self-incrimination.15
So, it’s not just that corporations cannot take the Fifth; it’s that anyone
involved in a collective enterprise cannot. Indeed, the Court cited this rule when
upholding the contempt conviction of a member of the Communist Party, who
refused to disclose records of the organization to Congress in 1951.16 In so
limiting the right for some, the Court erodes the protections of the Fifth
Amendment that apply to all.17
The following pages carefully examine and challenge the Court’s longstanding view that an individual who works for or joins an organization is not
protected by the Fifth Amendment when compelled to produce incriminating
records that ostensibly belong to the organization. Known as the “collective
entity” or “artificial entity” rule,18 the Court has described this rule as having “a

14
Robert Marshall Heier, Note, Books and Records and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 33 BROOK. L. REV. 70, 84-85 (1966) (“[O]ne bizarre case has even held a
ship’s records to fall outside the privilege on the grounds that such records are per se not the
records of the ship’s owner.” (citing Korthinos v. Niarchos, 175 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir.
1949))).
15
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); see also Mitchell Lewis Rothman,
Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business Documents, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 389
(1987).
16
See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372 (1951) (“[R]ecords kept ‘in a
representative rather than in a personal capacity cannot be the subject of the personal privilege
against self-incrimination, even though production of the papers might tend to incriminate
[their keeper] personally.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944))); see infra note 260 and accompanying text.
17
This happened in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S.
549 (1990). There, the Court relied upon the collective entity rule and the “required records”
doctrine, which created an exception to the Fifth Amendment’s plain text in order to promote
the government’s regulatory interests, to reject a mother’s claim that jailing her for refusing
to disclose to government officials the location of her presumed deceased infant violated her
privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 556.
18
Professor Mosteller calls this doctrine “the artificial entities exception” to the Fifth
Amendment, and helpfully explains that the rule has two parts: “First, the artificial entity itself
may not resist a subpoena on the grounds of self-incrimination. Second, a representative of
the entity may not refuse to provide an entity document even if production would be
personally incriminating.” Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth
Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1987) [hereinafter Mosteller, Simplifying
Subpoena Law] (emphasis added). This Article focuses on the second part of the rule—the
fact that the representative of the entity is not protected by the Fifth Amendment.
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lengthy and distinguished pedigree.”19 To be sure, the collective entity rule dates
back to the start of the twentieth century. But there is nothing “distinguished,”
and little to celebrate, about the rule. That is, unless one believes that certain
persons, based on employment status or membership in an organization, should
be compelled to give the government incriminating testimony.20
As demonstrated in the pages that follow, dissimilar outcomes under the
collective entity rule defy the text of the Fifth Amendment, the common law
history of the privilege, and the Court’s Fifth Amendment precedents. Indeed,
these precedents unmistakably establish that one’s employment status does not
diminish the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment or the ability to invoke
it. All of these failings can be found in the Court’s latest ruling on collective
entities—Braswell v. United States.21 Braswell was a five-four decision decided
in 1988.22 None of the current Justices were on the Court when Braswell was
decided. Since then, two current members of the Court—Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch—“have strongly suggested that they are prepared to reject current Fifth
Amendment doctrine in favor of whatever an originalist approach might

19

United States v. Braswell, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988).
Cf. Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New Era of Limited
Liability Entities—Should Business Entities Have a Fifth Amendment Privilege?, 2005
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2005) [hereinafter Cole, Limited Liability Entities] (“[T]he
history of the collective entity doctrine may be long, but it is hardly distinguished. Instead, it
is marked by shifting rationales, abandonment of no-longer-adequate conceptual
underpinnings, and blatantly result-oriented analysis, largely prompted by the Court’s
concerns about interfering unduly with law enforcement efforts” if earlier view of Fifth
Amendment is applied to business records . . . .”).
21
Braswell, 487 U.S. 99; see also infra Part III (discussing failures of cases like Braswell).
22
Professor Cole notes that “[i]n addition to the five-four split among the Justices, the
difficult nature of the issues presented by the Braswell case is evidenced by the fact that the
Justices did not divide along the usual ideological lines.” Cole, Limited Liability Entities,
supra note 20, at 42 n.150. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion that was
joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 100.
Justice Kennedy wrote “a spirited dissent” that was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Scalia. Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 173 & n.29 (1988). Justice Stevens’s vote in
Braswell may be explained by his view that occupation of certain job categories could result
in the forfeiture of one’s Fifth Amendment right. For example, in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion questioned the correctness of the Court’s earlier rulings
that employment as a police officer could not be conditioned upon the waiver of one’s Fifth
Amendment rights. 431 U.S. 801, 814 n.12 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of these so-called “penalty cases,” see infra notes 543-46 and accompanying text.
20
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reveal.”23 Also, in Chavez v. Martinez,24 Justice Thomas insisted that the text of
the Fifth Amendment required the Court to reject a claim that the privilege was
violated even when a police officer coerced an arrestee to incriminate himself.25
If text and originalism are important to Fifth Amendment doctrine, the
collective entity rule is ripe for repeal. It derives no support from the
amendment’s text or history, and it eliminates what Justice Field deems the Fifth
Amendment’s essential character: “[T]he shield of absolute silence.”26 As such,
the Court should overturn Braswell. Indeed, the Court may soon have an
opportunity to do so. The federal circuit courts are split on Braswell’s
applicability to former employees of artificial entities.27 This Article shows why
Braswell should be overturned.
23
Orin S. Kerr, Decryption Originalism: The Lessons of Burr, 134 HARV. L. REV. 905,
907-08 (2021); see also id. at 908 n.5 (“See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that the Fifth Amendment act of production doctrine ‘may be inconsistent with the
original meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause’ and that he ‘would be
willing to reconsider the scope and meaning’ of the Clause in a future case); Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (stating that although
existing Fifth Amendment precedent treats the privilege against self-incrimination as
‘applicable only to testimony, not the production of incriminating evidence[,] . . . there is
substantial evidence that the privilege . . . was also originally understood to protect a person
from being forced to turn over potentially incriminating evidence’).”). During her
confirmation hearings, Justice Amy Coney Barrett expressed a strong preference to decide
constitutional issues based on originalism. See Nomination of the Honorable Amy Coney
Barrett to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Amy Coney Barrett),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/nomination-of-the-honorable-amy-coney-barrettto-be-an-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/9MPH-8YZK].
24
538 U.S. 760 (2003).
25
Id. at 770 (“Although our cases have permitted the Fifth Amendment’s selfincrimination privilege to be asserted in noncriminal cases . . . that does not alter our
conclusion that a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination only occurs if
one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.” (citations
omitted)).
26
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 630 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting).
27
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have held or stated that Braswell’s collective
entity theory is not applicable to former employees. See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999, 191 F.3d 173, 181 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 133-34 & 133 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
71 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have held the opposite. See
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 1992); In re
Sealed Case (Government Records), 950 F.2d 736, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also Alice W.
Yao, Comment, Former Corporate Officers and Employees in the Context of the Collective
Entity and Act of Production Doctrines, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2001) (resolving
circuit split by arguing doctrine “should apply to former employees in cases where there is a
continuing fiduciary relationship”); Aaron Finesilver, Note, A Refusal to Produce Corporate
Documents: The Fifth Amendment’s Protection of Former Employees, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
APP. ADVOC. 103, 105 (2002) (concluding Braswell should apply to former employees by
“compelling the production of corporate documents in their possession”).
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Part I will set the stage: outlining the constitutional defects with the collective
entity rule, that imperfect tool by which the Court has limited the constitutional
rights of so many. Such defects include different outcomes for similar
defendants and the refusal to recognize that the Fifth Amendment does not
limit—in any manner—the type of “person” who is protected.
Part II describes the history and important rulings that comprise the Court’s
collective entity doctrine. In the nineteenth century, cases such as Boyd v. United
States28 and Counselman v. Hitchcock29 saw the Court vigorously securing the
protections of the Fifth Amendment. But starting with Hale v. Henkel30 in 1906,
all the way to Braswell in 1988, the Court has used case after case to roll back
the protections of the Fifth Amendment.
Part III explains why the collective entity doctrine cannot be reconciled with
established Fifth Amendment doctrine and thus should be repealed. This final
section of the Article examines the critical failures of cases like Braswell and
shows how the Court can—and should—reset. Logic calls for such a change; the
Constitution demands it.
I.

THE PROBLEMS WITH THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY RULE

Judge Jerome Frank once described the Self-Incrimination Clause as a “noble
principle [that] often transcends its origins, . . . account[ing] for some of our
most cherished values and institutions.”31 Yet, at the same time, many respected
legal scholars have condemned the privilege, and some have advocated for its
repeal. The critics’ main complaint is that the privilege prevents law
enforcement officials from questioning the person or persons most likely to
know the facts surrounding a crime. In short, “[t]he Self-Incrimination Clause is
probably our most schizophrenic amendment.”32 The Supreme Court has
responded to this quandary mostly by siding with the interests of law
enforcement when deciding Fifth Amendment cases. At times, the Court’s
choice to diminish the amendment is untenable. Case in point is the collective
entity doctrine.
Consider this scenario: A federal grand jury is investigating corruption in the
awarding of county and municipal contracts to local businesses. The sole
proprietor of one business, Sammy Sleaze, is suspected to have received such
contracts. The Fifth Amendment bars the grand jury from forcing Sleaze to
provide oral testimony unless he is given immunity for his testimony. The grand
jury could subpoena Sleaze’s business records, but Sleaze’s act of producing
those documents might also be testimony against him because it would reveal
28

116 U.S. 616 (1886).
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
30
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
31
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting),
rev’d, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
32
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 311 (1991).
29
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that the records existed, Sleaze controlled the records, and the records produced
were authentic. Thus, unless the government has an alternative source for the
information it seeks regarding Sleaze’s business records, the grand jury must
grant Sleaze immunity to obtain the records.33
The grand jury also suspects that Freddy Fraud, the sole shareholder of FF
Inc., has been awarded corrupt contracts. Like Sleaze, Fraud cannot be
compelled to provide oral testimony to the grand jury, but under the collective
entity doctrine, Fraud cannot invoke the Fifth to resist the same type of subpoena
that Sleaze received because Fraud operated his business as a corporation.
According to the collective entity rule, Fraud, as a corporate officer, has no
privilege because he has impliedly waived his Fifth Amendment right not to be
compelled to incriminate himself, and when the records are disclosed to the
grand jury, it is not really Fraud disclosing the records but the corporation
performing the disclosure. Thus, the grand jury can compel disclosure of FF
Inc.’s business documents—the same type of records it could not compel from
Sleaze’s business without an immunity grant. If those documents are
incriminating, Fraud will be convicted and may serve time in prison.
What motivates the result in Fraud’s case is the need for effective law
enforcement, as the Court candidly admitted in Braswell,34 its most recent
opinion on the collective entity rule. If someone in Fraud’s shoes “could assert
a privilege, authorities would be stymied not only in their enforcement efforts
against those individuals but also in their prosecutions of organizations.”35 But
the need for effective law enforcement is equally important in Sleaze’s situation.
However, prosecutors in that scenario must live with the Fifth Amendment.
Disparate results for essentially the same facts are intolerable in a legal system
committed to “Equal Justice Under Law.”36
But these practical failings are made worse by logical failings. For starters, as
applied to natural persons, the collective entity rule is circular.37 Long ago, the
Court decreed that corporations and other artificial entities are not protected by
33
See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79 (1973) (explaining that despite government’s
important interest in enforcement of its ordinary criminal laws, “the price for incriminating
answers from third-party witnesses is sufficient immunity to satisfy the imperatives of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination”).
34
See United States v. Braswell, 487 U.S. 99, 115 (1988) (explaining that “a Fifth
Amendment privilege on behalf of the records custodians of collective entities would have a
detrimental impact on the Government’s efforts to prosecute ‘white-collar crime,’ one of the
most serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities”).
35
Id. at 116.
36
The words “Equal Justice Under Law” are engraved above the front entrance of the
Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C. About the Court, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/9FHZ-9JJ2] (last visited
Sept. 23, 2021).
37
Cf. Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 82 (noting Court’s most recent
defense of collective entity rule “is both circular and tautological; it fails to provide a
satisfactory rationale for withholding the privilege from corporations and other collective
entities”).
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the Fifth Amendment. Yet when a representative of the entity is subpoenaed to
disclose organizational records that incriminate him personally, the Court
ignores that a natural person—not a fictional entity—satisfies the three elements
required to invoke the privilege: the person is subject to (1) official compulsion
to produce, (2) incriminating, (3) testimony.38 In its haste to deny corporations
Fifth Amendment protection, the Court has jettisoned the rights of individuals.
And in so doing, the Court has undermined the point of having the Fifth
Amendment in the Constitution.39
Rather than grapple with a valid invocation of the Fifth by an individual who
happens to work for a collective entity, the Court instead addresses “the fifth
amendment claims of corporate functionaries over corporate documents as a
problem closely related to the corporation’s lack of fifth amendment
protection.”40 Under this approach, a “dubious asymmetry”41 is created: the
corporate officer is not protected by the Fifth Amendment while the sole
proprietor of a business is protected.42
This is no trivial distinction.43 Webster Hubbell’s invocation of the Fifth
helped him avoid prosecution on federal tax and fraud charges, after a subpoena
forced him to reveal thousands of pages documents and records.44 But if Hubbell
38
See Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law, supra note 18, at 6 (“It is firmly established
that the fifth amendment is violated only if the defendant’s conduct is compelled, testimonial,
and incriminating.”).
39
Cf. id. at 50 n.149 (“If the denial of the privilege against self-incrimination to
corporations is interpreted to mean also that the real persons who work within it lose their
personal privilege, then the supporting structure and theory of the fifth amendment are directly
implicated.”).
40
Corporate Crime, supra note 12, at 1281.
41
Id. at 1283.
42
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984) (concluding that Fifth Amendment
applies to business records of sole proprietor).
43
See Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents—Cutting Fisher’s
Tangled Line, 49 MO. L. REV. 439, 441-42 (1984) (noting that because person or business
operating as sole proprietor may invoke Fifth Amendment to suppress records, they “enjoy a
substantial advantage in litigation over entities denied the privilege” and “[t]his advantage is
exploited most often to impede grand jury and tax investigations”); Yao, supra note 27, at
1488 (“Where the collective entity doctrine does not apply, however, the act of production
doctrine precludes the production of documents altogether, thereby denying a prosecutor
potentially incriminating evidence.”).
44
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 46 (2000). In response to a federal subpoena
for a wide range of documents—a federal judge described the subpoena “as ‘the quintessential
fishing expedition,’” id. at 32 (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C.
1998))—Hubbell took the Fifth. He received a grant of immunity and then disclosed 13,120
pages of documents to the Independent Counsel. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 33. The
Independent Counsel’s examination of those documents led to an indictment of Hubbell for
tax-related crimes and mail and wire fraud charges. Id. at 37. As the Court explained in
Hubbell, the Independent Counsel needed Hubbell’s act of production “to identify potential
sources of information and to produce those sources.” 530 U.S. at 41. Put another way, it was
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had practiced law as a corporate entity, he could not have invoked the Fifth. As
a constitutional norm, this distinction is arbitrary and ridiculous.45
More importantly, as applied to individuals who work for or are members of
organizations, the collective entity rule cannot be reconciled with the text of the
Fifth Amendment itself, or even the amendment’s common law origins.46
Further, the Court’s precedents constructing and applying the rule have offered
various inconsistent justifications for an unvarying outcome: custodians of entity
records cannot invoke the Fifth.47
“abundantly clear that the testimonial aspect of [Hubbell’s] act of producing subpoenaed
documents was the first step in a chain of evidence that led to [his] prosecution.” Id. at 42. A
detailed examination of Hubbell is beyond the scope of this Article, but Lance Cole, Robert
Mosteller, and H. Richard Uviller have provided excellent analyses of Hubbell. See generally
Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents After
United States v. Hubbell—New Protection for Private Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123 (2002)
[hereinafter Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production] (addressing whether
Fifth Amendment protects against compelled production of incriminating personal documents
by subject of criminal investigation); Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and
Subpoenas for Incriminating Evidence: The Consequences and Correction of Excess, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (2001) [hereinafter Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors] (considering
modern importance of Fifth Amendment to prosecutors); H. Richard Uviller, Foreword:
Fisher Goes on the Quintessential Fishing Expedition and Hubbell Is Off the Hook, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2001) (discussing Fifth Amendment privilege in wake of
Hubbell and Fisher decisions).
45
See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar
Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 425
(1993) [hereinafter Henning, Testing the Limits] (“That decision can have momentous
consequences, because if the business is not incorporated, the owner may be able to shield the
records through the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. It is even possible under
Braswell for a person to own two businesses, one a corporation and the other a sole
proprietorship, and be able to assert the privilege to resist production of one set of records yet
be forced to produce the records for the other business. It is odd that the seemingly
inconsequential choice of what organizational form to use for a business, which may have
little if any effect on its operations, can determine the applicability of a constitutional right.”).
46
See infra notes 454-70 and accompanying text.
47
See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48
U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 68 (1986) (noting that from Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), to Bellis
v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), “the cases dealing with subpoenas for institutional
records were uniform in result but wavering in explanation”); Mosteller, Simplifying
Subpoena Law, supra note 18, at 50 (listing five justifications the Court has proffered for
collective entity rule); David N. Lathrop, Braswell v. United States: The Collective Entity
Doctrine and the Compelled Testimony Standard, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 553, 556-57
(1989) (listing various and differing rationales offered by Court for collective entity rule); cf.
Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 793, 801 (1996) [hereinafter Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability] (“Since [Hale],
the Court has rejected corporate claims to the privilege against self-incrimination. This has
been mainly because permitting the assertion of the right would have a deleterious effect on
the enforcement of regulatory provisions, which were designed to curb corporate
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At bottom, the collective entity rule is part legal realism and part hostility to
the privilege: from its origins and continuing today, the collective entity rule
arises from the belief that without the authority to inspect the books and
documents of organizations, many economic crimes might go undetected.48 The
rule also reflects opposition to the Fifth Amendment.49 Put simply, law

misconduct.”); id. at 861 (“The invariable, and even expansive, denial of the privilege against
self-incrimination for a variety of organizations, including a single-shareholder corporation,
shows that the Court is not willing to allow the government’s enforcement program to be
adversely affected by permitting any corporate claim of the privilege.”).
48
See, e.g., Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 47, at 828 (“The Court’s
rationale for adopting increasingly broad definitions of the types of entities that may not
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination could be found in its expressed fear of
undermining the government’s law enforcement effort if it construed the corporation’s
constitutional rights too expansively.”); Corporate Crime, supra note 12, at 1283
(“[D]ocumentary evidence often supplies the only physical evidence for the government’s
case, so a blanket privilege would thwart the enforcement of many economic regulations.”);
Rothman, supra note 15, at 389 (stating result in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911),
Court’s first case denying corporate officer Fifth Amendment protection under collective
entity rule, was “apparently demanded by the fight against corporate crime”); Gregory I.
Massing, Note, The Fifth Amendment, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Prosecution of
White-Collar Crime, 75 VA. L. REV. 1179, 1198 (1989) (“The collective entity doctrine owes
its continuing vitality largely to a policy decision to facilitate the prosecution of economic
crimes.”).
49
The Justices, of course, would never admit such hostility in their opinions. They are too
sophisticated to do so. But cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (remarking
Self-Incrimination Clause “might be lost, and justice still be done”). Justice Cardozo also
opined that “[j]ustice . . . would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to
orderly inquiry.” Id. at 326. Others, however, are not so reticent. One scholar, writing at the
time of the Court’s first important case on the Fifth Amendment rights of corporations and
their officers, expressed open contempt for the Fifth. He stated that the Fifth Amendment
ought to be abolished, at least in criminal cases. The reasons for it have ceased to exist,
and it is now merely a protection to rogues against justice. . . .
How to deal with great business combinations, trusts, monopolies and large
corporations that have recently grown up among us is one of the most serious problems
that now confront the people. . . . Certain kinds of acts must be made criminal, if they
are not so now, and the individuals who do such acts must be punished. It is of little use
to take any sort of legal proceedings against the corporations, the artificial persons. The
offending individuals must be reached and treated as criminals. But this cannot be done
effectively so long as the rule that a person need not incriminate himself stands. That
rule cripples the administration of the criminal law, and makes it an almost useless
weapon against the evils and abuse of combination.
Henry T. Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against Forcing Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE L.J.
127, 127, 129 (1906).
Opposition to the principle against compelled self-incrimination is long-standing. Probably
the best-known critique of the privilege was proffered by the British legal scholar Jeremy
Bentham. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE bk. IX, pt. IV, ch. III,
230, 238-39 (Garland Publ’g 1978) (1827) (criticizing claim that it is cruel and unfair to
compel accused persons to incriminate themselves as “old woman’s reason,” and describing
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enforcement needs must prevail over the right of the individual not to be
compelled to produce incriminating testimony.

argument that requiring accused persons to answer potentially incriminating questions gave
unfair advantage to prosecution as “fox-hunter’s reason,” which confused sport with search
for truth).
America’s foremost evidence scholar, John Henry Wigmore, proposed abolishing the
amendment in 1891. John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71,
87 (1891). A few years later, Wigmore’s view of the Fifth Amendment had softened—a bit:
For the sake, then, not of the guilty, but of the innocent accused, and of conservative and
healthy principles of judicial conduct, the privilege should be preserved.
....
The privilege therefore should be kept within limits the strictest possible. So much of
it lies in the interpretation that its scope will be greatly affected by the spirit in which
that interpretation is approached.
3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2251 (1905).
In 1959, Lewis Mayers wrote a book critiquing the Fifth Amendment and offered changes
for interpreting the Fifth that would limit its scope. LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT? 183 (1959). Less than a decade later, in 1968, the well-respected federal
appellate judge Henry Friendly offered an informal list of statements from “great and learned
men” who have opposed or recommended limiting the privilege since the late nineteenth
century to the mid-twentieth century. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow:
The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 672-74 (1968); see also Mickey
Kaus, The Fifth Is Now Obsolete, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1986, at A19 (contending that there
is no convincing justification for the privilege, and the amendment’s original purpose to
protect religious and political freedoms can be served “by other, far less destructive,
constitutional rules”). In 1986, David Dolinko argued that “contemporary efforts to justify the
privilege as more than a historical relic are uniformly unsatisfactory and that no efforts along
similar lines are likely to succeed.” David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1986); see also id. at 1147
(“[T]he role of the privilege in American law can be explained by specific historical
developments, but cannot be justified either functionally or conceptually.” (footnote
omitted)). In a perceptive Article, Donald Dripps argued against both police interrogation and
the Fifth Amendment. Donald A. Dripps, Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 734 (1988) (“[Americans] do
not really need to be persuaded that the privilege is a mistake. The institution of police
interrogation proves our practical rejection of the privilege.”). But cf. Schulhofer, supra note
32, at 336 (responding to academic and judicial criticism of privilege and contending that
Fifth Amendment “is a very practical and very important safeguard”). More recently, Akhil
Reed Amar and Renée B. Lettow have called for a major reconsideration of what the Fifth
Amendment requires. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment
First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995) (proposing new
rationale and scope for Self-Incrimination Clause). For responses to Amar and Lettow’s
proposals, see generally Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced
Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929 (1995); and Donald Dripps,
Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong
Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996). For the response to the response, see Akhil Reed
Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Self-Incrimination and the Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder to
Professor Kamisar, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1011 (1995).
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Of course, the government’s interest “to regulate homicide is also important
and abiding.”50 But the Court has not yet “suggested that the privilege against
self-incrimination yield as well to that interest.”51 Nor does the Fifth
Amendment permit such naked policy choices. The amendment’s command—
that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself”—does not permit judicial balancing of interests.52
Fairness and equal treatment should also matter. As the law currently stands,
a person who operates his business as sole shareholder is not protected by the
Fifth Amendment, but the sole proprietor is protected. This “anomalous
result . . . represents the worst of all possible worlds—an unnecessary and
unjustifiable legal doctrine that treats similarly situated people differently.”53
Lastly, several legal scholars have criticized or called for the abandonment of
the collective entity rule.54
50

Heier, supra note 14, at 78.
Id.
52
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Where the privilege is properly invoked, the Court has
unequivocally stated that “[b]alancing . . . is not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible.”
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979). See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
400 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment’s strictures, unlike the Fourth’s, are not removed by
showing reasonableness.”); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 129 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “the text of the Fifth Amendment does not authorize exceptions
premised on [the government’s interest in law enforcement]”); see also Albert W. Alschuler,
A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2625, 2634 (1996) (“The privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment . . . is unqualified. The
Framers of the Constitution apparently concluded that no amount of evidence could justify
compelling a person to supply testimonial evidence against herself in a criminal case.”);
Nancy J. King, Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege for Producing Corporate Documents, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1544, 1565 n.123 (1986) (citing United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 40 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1983)); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers
in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 368 (1979); Heier, supra note 14, at 79; Note,
Organizational Papers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640,
652-54 (1986) [hereinafter Organizational Papers]; cf. Alito, supra note 47, at 36 (stating
Fifth Amendment applies only to compelled self-incrimination; “[n]evertheless, within this
limited sphere its prohibition is absolute. It does not merely regulate procedures, and it forbids
any force or compulsion for the purpose of extracting self-incrimination”).
53
Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 107.
54
See, e.g., id.; Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law, supra note 18, at 2; Rothman, supra
note 15, at 387-88; William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105
YALE L.J. 393, 429-33 (1995) (describing ruling in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), as
“result-oriented”); Marvin G. Pickholz & Paul N. Murphy, Corporate Officers and Employees
After Braswell: Is No Document Sacred?, 18 SEC. REGUL. L.J. 359, 363 (1991); Lathrop,
supra note 47, at 555; Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 170-80 (discussing Braswell); Robert
Bonvouloir Foster, Comment, The Right Against Self-Incrimination by Producing
Documents: Rethinking the Representative Capacity Doctrine, 80 NW. L. REV. 1605, 1607
(1986); King, supra note 52, at 1562; Organizational Papers, supra note 52, at 649-50; Scott
D. Price, Note, Braswell v. United States: An Examination of a Custodian’s Fifth Amendment
Right to Avoid Personal Production of Corporate Records, 34 VILL. L. REV. 353, 359-62
51
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One purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to bar “fishing expeditions” of a
person’s mind to protect the individual from being forcibly “conscripted by [the
government] to defeat himself.”55 Put differently, “the privilege at its heart has
always protected a form of secrecy—the right not to share one’s testimony with
the government,”56 specifically incriminating testimony.
If this is so, then the Justices need to reconsider the collective entity rule. In
short, they need to explain why the Fifth Amendment, which commands that
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself,”57 does not protect a natural person who is the target of a criminal
investigation when the government compels him to disclose testimony that
personally incriminates him.
The next section, Part II, describes the history and important rulings that
comprise the Court’s collective entity doctrine.
II.

THE BEGINNINGS

In 1988, Justice Samuel Alito, then working in the Department of Justice,
accurately and neatly summarized the collective entity cases: “[F]rom Hale in
1906 to Bellis in 1974, the cases dealing with subpoenas for institutional records
were uniform in result but wavering in explanation.”58 That is, the result in every
case was that a natural person asserting a viable Fifth Amendment claim was
told by the Court that he had no privilege because he worked for or was a
member of an artificial entity.59 In essence, the person invoking the Fifth,
according to the Court, had waived his right by taking the job or joining a
group.60 But that wasn’t always the case. Before 1906, two cases set the stage
for an entirely different interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. In fact, it was so
(1989); John M. Grogan, Jr., Fifth Amendment—The Act of Production Privilege: The
Supreme Court’s Portrait of a Dualistic Record Custodian, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
701, 702 (1988); H. Robert Fiebach, Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 394, 416 (1964).
55
John T. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional
Affectation, Raison d’Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
138, 151 (1960); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964) (describing one policy of privilege as mandating “a fair state-individual balancing by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder
the entire load” (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 49, at 317)).
56
Stuntz, supra note 54, at 394.
57
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58
Alito, supra note 47, at 68 (first citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); and then
citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974)).
59
Edwin F. Hale’s Fifth Amendment claim was denied because he was given immunity
for his testimony and production of corporate documents. See infra notes 152-73 and
accompanying text.
60
Cf. Alito, supra note 47, at 69 (noting since Wilson, the Court has rejected claims of
privilege on “the theory of implied waiver: by assuming custody of unprivileged records an
individual was deemed to waive his personal privilege”).
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powerful an assertion of privilege that the Court—looking to curtail the Fifth
Amendment for an ever more powerful state—had to spend the next hundred
years tearing it down.
In 1886—the same Court Term and calendar year that the Justices announced
that corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause—the Court decided Boyd v. United
States.61 One of the Court’s best-known and controversial rulings, Boyd has been
much praised and widely condemned by Justices who later sat on the Court and
by legal scholars. Justice Brandeis described Boyd as “a case that will be
remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States,”62 while Chief
Justice Burger once told his colleagues that “[a] lot of Boyd v. United States is a
lot of unmitigated nonsense.”63
Looking back, it is ironic that Boyd laid the foundation for Fourth and Fifth
Amendment doctrine because “Boyd was not a typical criminal case; in fact, it
was not a criminal case at all.”64 E.A. Boyd & Sons, a partnership owned by
Edward and George Boyd, had a contract with the federal government to supply
imported glass for the construction of a federal building in Philadelphia.65 The
company was permitted to import the glass duty-free.66 A dispute arose between
the parties about the amount of duty-free glass that was supplied by the
company.67
The Boyds claimed that they were entitled to more glass because some of the
imported glass had been damaged during transit.68 The government disagreed,

61
116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd was decided on February 1, 1886, three months before the
Court’s decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394
(1886), which was announced on May 10, 1886. Santa Clara County held, without discussion,
that corporations are “persons” entitled to equal protection from discriminatory state laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Earlier during that same October 1885 Term, the Court
was considering whether corporations were “persons” under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885). However, San Mateo County was settled so the Court did
not address the issue. For a fascinating account of the legal maneuverings surrounding San
Mateo County and Santa Clara County, see WINKLER, supra note 4, at 113-60.
62
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 776 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (characterizing Boyd
as “among the greatest constitutional decisions of this Court”). Professor Edward Corwin in
his influential Article on the Fifth Amendment described Boyd and Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892), discussed below, as “outstanding decisions.” Edward S. Corwin, The
Supreme Court’s Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13
(1930) [hereinafter Corwin I].
63
THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 468 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
64
Stuntz, supra note 54, at 422.
65
Rothman, supra note 15, at 390.
66
Stuntz, supra note 54, at 422.
67
Id.
68
Id.
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and instituted a forfeiture proceeding after federal officers seized thirty-five
cases of glass shipped to the company for which customs duties had not been
paid.69
Pursuant to an 1874 federal tax law, a district court judge ordered the
company to produce an invoice for a previous shipment of glass.70 Under the
law, failure to comply with the court order meant that the government’s
allegations would be taken as confessed.71 The company complied under
protest.72 After losing in the lower courts, the company took their claim to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the court order for the invoice violated the firm’s
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and their
right not to be compelled to provide incriminating evidence.73 The Court ruled
for the Boyds.74
This result was far from expected. Prior to Boyd, the Court had not said much
about the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause.75 Indeed, Boyd was “the first case in which the Court considered the fifth
amendment’s application to documents.”76 Writing for the majority, Justice
Bradley conceded that no search or seizure was authorized by the court order for
69

Id.
19 U.S.C. § 535 (1874). As Richard Epstein has helpfully explained, “the calculation of
the proper tax on the thirty-five cases of plate glass seized by the tax collector depended on
the ‘quantity and value of the glass contained in twenty-nine cases previously imported [by
the company].’” Richard A. Epstein, Entick v. Carrington and Boyd v. United States: Keeping
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments on Track, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 27, 42 (2015). The court order
sought the invoice for the shipment of the twenty-nine cases in order to prove that the
company had fraudulently claimed credit for glass that had not been used in the construction
for the building in Philadelphia. Id. (“The lower court already possessed the letter that Boyd
had sent to the US Treasury stating his claim for the credit. It needed the earlier invoice to
close the loop on the fraud.” (footnote omitted)).
The Court’s opinion did not clarify whether one of the Boyds, the brothers together, the
partnership, or a combination of all was the party raising the constitutional objection to the
court order. The Court refers to the “claimants of the invoice” in its opinion. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 618 (1886).
71
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620.
72
Id. at 618.
73
Id. at 621.
74
Id. at 638.
75
Alito, supra note 47, at 39 (describing Boyd as Court’s “first significant case involving
the fourth amendment or the fifth amendment privilege”); Gerstein, supra note 52, at 362
(asserting that “[t]hrough most of the course of the nineteenth century, . . . there was no
development in America of the application of the self-incrimination privilege to private
papers,” and thus Boyd was Court’s “first disquisition on the fifth amendment privilege”).
Professor Corwin explains that one reason for the Court’s silence on the Fifth Amendment
from the Founding Era to the late nineteenth century was because “accused persons on trial
in the federal courts were excluded from taking the stand at all, while the test which was
applied to the immunities claimed by witnesses—not only in the federal courts but in the state
courts as well—was the direct test of the common law.” Corwin I, supra note 62, at 13.
76
Organizational Papers, supra note 52, at 642.
70
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the invoice and that the proceeding below was not “within the literal terms of
the Fifth Amendment . . . any more than it is within the literal terms of the
Fourth.”77 Because failure to produce the invoice, however, meant that the
government’s claims would be taken as proven, Justice Bradley concluded that
the order was “tantamount to compelling” disclosure of the invoice.78 Justice
Bradley then reasoned that a compulsory production of a person’s papers
triggered Fourth Amendment protection “because it is a material ingredient, and
effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure.”79 And the court order
was “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment because it sought private
papers owned by the Boyds, which Justice Bradley distinguished from a search
seeking stolen goods or contraband.80
Justice Bradley then addressed the Boyds’ Fifth Amendment claim. He saw
an “intimate relation between” the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.81 He
explained that unreasonable searches and seizures are often performed for the
purpose of “compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned” by the Fifth Amendment.82 Compelling a person
to provide incriminating testimony “throws light on the question as to what is an
‘unreasonable search and seizure’” under the Fourth Amendment.83 Thus,
Justice Bradley believed that seizing a person’s private papers to be used against
him was indistinguishable from compelling him to be a witness against
himself.84 When read this way, “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost
into each other.”85
Justice Miller penned a concurring opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Waite.86 Justice Miller found that the statute did not authorize a search or
seizure,87 and he discerned no nexus between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Instead, Justice Miller relied solely on the Fifth Amendment to rule for the

77

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633.
Id. at 621-22.
79
Id. at 622.
80
Id. at 623. (“The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to
duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search
for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information
therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him.”).
81
Id. at 633.
82
Id. Professor Nagareda summarized Justice Bradley’s reasoning as follows: “The
compelled production of self-incriminatory documents amounts to an unreasonable search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, for that reason, also constitutes
the compulsion of a person ‘to be a witness against himself’ in violation of the Fifth.” Richard
A. Nagareda, Compulsion “To Be a Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1575, 1585 (1999).
83
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 630.
86
Id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring).
87
Id.
78
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Boyds. Like the majority, Justice Miller believed that the forfeiture proceeding
was a criminal case within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.88 Next, Justice
Miller found that the court order for the invoice was the equivalent of a subpoena
duces tecum because failure to comply meant that the government’s allegations
against the Boyds were deemed confessed “and made the foundation of the
judgment of the court.”89 For Justice Miller, that was a “clear” violation of the
privilege because the Boyds were compelled to produce incriminating evidence
against themselves.90
Boyd’s impact on the development of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence cannot be understated.91 As a practical matter, Boyd planted the
seeds for what would become the federal exclusionary rule, which barred in
judicial proceedings the admission of evidence obtained by violating a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights.92 Boyd also seemed to announce a per se rule that
forbade the government from searching for or seizing private property,
“particularly private papers, in which it had no possessory or other property
interest, even when it could assert a rational basis for the intrusion.”93
Regarding the meaning and scope of the Fifth Amendment, however, Boyd
provided little guidance.94 To be sure, Justice Bradley’s opinion did not embrace
88
Id. As Professor Nagareda perceptively noted, failure to produce the invoice would not
only have amounted to a “confession” of the government’s charges and resulted in the
forfeiture of the seized thirty-five cases of glass “but also [subjected the Boyds or the
partnership] to the prospect of criminal sanctions.” Nagareda, supra note 82, at 1586.
89
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring).
90
Id. Regrettably, Justice Miller did not explain why there was a “clear” violation of the
Fifth Amendment. See Nagareda, supra note 82, at 1590.
91
See, e.g., MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 163 (1980) (asserting Boyd was “for a long time the
cornerstone of both Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and is the necessary starting
point in assessing the role of the privilege against self-incrimination in controlling
government acquisition of incriminating evidence”).
92
See Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court’s Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 191, 203 (1930) (noting Boyd established “the rule that evidence
obtained in violation of a person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment may not under the
Fifth Amendment be validly received against him in any criminal prosecution in a federal
court”). In 1914, the seeds planted by Boyd bore fruit when in Weeks v. United States, the
Justices unanimously held that private papers discovered pursuant to an unconstitutional
search and seizure could not be used in a federal criminal prosecution. 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914). In contrast to Boyd, Weeks concluded that the Fourth Amendment alone barred the
admission of illegally obtained evidence in a federal prosecution. Id. at 397. For a fuller
analysis of Boyd’s impact on the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, see TRACEY
MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 3-17
(2013).
93
Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 579 (1996).
94
Before he was placed on the Court, Samuel Alito, Jr., remarked that Boyd “surely
contains no independent fifth amendment analysis.” Alito, supra note 47, at 38 n.55; see also

2021]

LONG OVERDUE

1543

a literal or narrow view of the Self-Incrimination Clause. He could have said
that the forfeiture proceeding was not a “criminal case” within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment, and he most certainly did not interpret the amendment’s
scope as confined to the scenario of a criminal defendant being forced to take
the stand in his own case. Rather, Justice Bradley (as well as Justice Miller)
embraced a broad view of the Fifth Amendment and extended its protection to
include compulsion of documents and other private objects.95
History has not been kind to Boyd’s reasoning, perhaps because the Court
offered so little substantive analysis to justify its result. One hundred years later,
Justice Kennedy remarked that Boyd “generated nearly a century of doctrinal
ambiguity.”96 Most, if not all, of the constitutional rules announced in Boyd have
been overruled by the modern Court.97 Viewed in retrospect, the Justices should
have followed Justice Miller’s lead and decided Boyd solely on Fifth
Amendment grounds.98 Although Boyd would be studied by early twentieth
century lawyers as a Fourth Amendment case, by today’s legal standards, the
court order for the invoice was not an unreasonable search or seizure. Indeed,
“no search or seizure occurred.”99

Friendly, supra note 49, at 682. Judge Friendly described Justice Bradley’s Fifth Amendment
analysis as “surprising blindness,” “vacuous,” and suggested that the Boyd Court was, like the
Warren Court eighty years later, “[o]bsess[ed]” with the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 681-82. As
noted above, besides correctly characterizing the court order for the invoice as the equivalent
of a subpoena duces tecum, Justice Miller’s conclusion that the Fifth Amendment was violated
is entirely conclusory. See Nagareda, supra note 83, at 1590.
95
See Corwin I, supra note 62, at 13-14 (explaining Boyd rejected views adopted by
several lower federal courts which read Fifth Amendment not to apply to forfeiture
proceedings and “meant to cover only oral testimony given under oath, not evidence afforded
by books and papers”).
96
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 121 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
97
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976) (“Several of Boyd’s express or
implicit declarations have not stood the test of time.”).
98
Professor Nagareda’s insightful Article makes a compelling case for the “rehabilitation
of Boyd, and for a consequent reorientation of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence as a whole, by
explicating the wisdom of the Miller view.” Nagareda, supra note 83, at 1581. Nagareda’s
thesis is:
The phrase “to be a witness” in the Fifth Amendment is best understood as synonymous
with the phrase “to give evidence” used in the proposals for a bill of rights formulated
by state ratifying conventions upon consideration of the original Constitution. The
compulsion of a person to produce self-incriminatory documents is literally the
compulsion of that person “to give evidence” against himself—that is, to turn over
documents for possible use as incriminatory evidence in a subsequent criminal trial.
Id. at 1580 (footnote omitted).
99
Rothman, supra note 15, at 391-92 (“[T]he trial court’s order demanding the invoice
was the functional equivalent of a subpoena duces tecum requiring production of business
documents for preliminary investigation or proof at trial. When seen in this light, Boyd is not
really a fourth amendment case at all; it is a fifth amendment opinion.” (footnote omitted)).
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Further, merging the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to rule in favor of the
Boyds “only confused matters, making privacy more important in selfincrimination cases than it otherwise might have been.”100
If analyzed solely as a Fifth Amendment case, however, Boyd stands on a
stronger constitutional foundation. And if viewed through the lens of the
prohibition of forced self-incrimination, Boyd offers certain insights for
determining the rights of persons who work for collective entities.
First, as the law stood in the late nineteenth century, the Boyds did have a
valid Fifth Amendment objection to the court order demanding the production
of the invoice. As Wigmore explained in his 1905 evidence treatise, “[t]he
privilege protects a person from any disclosure sought by legal process against
him as a witness.”101 Indeed, Wigmore thought the Fifth Amendment aspect of
Boyd was “properly” decided, although he vigorously opposed Justice Bradley’s
merging of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to rule in favor of the Boyds.102
Wigmore did not have an iconoclastic view of the Fifth Amendment. As many
have noted, as applied to the Boyds, the 1874 federal law violated the Fifth
Amendment because the amendment “was intended to preserve the common law
privilege against compelled self-incrimination and . . . the privilege, as
interpreted at the time of the Bill of Rights, encompassed the compulsory
production of papers.”103 At the Founding, the “common-law privilege against
self-incrimination protected against the compelled production of incriminating
physical evidence such as papers and documents.”104 That is why Boyd asserted
that prior to the Founding era, “one cardinal rule of the court of chancery is never
to decree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of crime.”105
This view of the Fifth Amendment is consistent with the constitutional text as
well as common sense. “A priori, . . . one might . . . believe that being
100

Id. at 392. Many have criticized Boyd’s merging theory, and rightfully so. For example,
the Boyd Court’s inability to distinguish the invasion of privacy by unlawful search and
seizure from the compelled disclosure of inculpatory facts ultimately doomed the case.
Security in person and place has nothing whatever to do with freedom from government
coercion. . . . [Thus,] the two Amendments do not “run almost into each other.” They
diverge sharply to protect in different ways two very different aspects of personal
security and autonomy.
Uviller, supra note 44, at 329-30. For criticism of Boyd’s reliance on the Fourth
Amendment, see Rothman, supra note 15, at 392 n.19.
101
WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2263.
102
Id. § 2264 (stating Boyd’s holding that “an order for production of documents involving
self-criminating matter was properly held to be within the privilege”; condemning Boyd’s use
of the Fourth Amendment to prohibit “seizure describing specific documents in the possession
of a specific person”; and highlighting that, “apart from this error, the radical fallacy of the
opinion lies in its attempt to wrest the Fourth Amendment to the aid of the Fifth” because
“[t]he ‘intimate relation between them,’ which the opinion predicates, must be wholly
denied”)
103
Alito, supra note 47, at 35.
104
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 51 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
105
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886).
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compelled (by court process or otherwise) to furnish previously-expressed
cerebral evidence that might be used in securing a conviction violates the explicit
terms of the Fifth Amendment: not to be compelled to be a witness against
oneself.”106 And thinking sensibly, compelling a person to reveal documents,
especially documents that he or she may have authored, is comparable to probing
the person’s mental facilities—albeit after the person’s thoughts have been
memorialized on paper or, in modern times, typed into a computer.107 Thus, “the
attraction” of Boyd’s Fifth Amendment reasoning was “[s]elf-inculpatory words
spoken under compulsion, which emanates either from interrogation or the
process of the subpoena ad testificandum, do not seem intuitively so different
from words spoken or written freely but produced under compulsion of the
subpoena duces tecum.”108
Second, who actually owned the invoice—the partnership, the Boyd brothers,
or some combination of the two—was irrelevant to the Boyd Court. “Boyd
proceeded on the assumption that the organization and its constituent members

106

Uviller, supra note 44, at 314.
See Alito, supra note 47, at 39 (suggesting that certain preexisting intimate personal
documents, like diaries, should be protected by Fifth Amendment privilege). Justice Alito
stated that:
Boyd may have survived because its reasoning contained a kernel of truth. Certain
intimate personal documents—a diary is the best example—are like an extension of the
individual’s mind. They are a substitute for the perfect memory that humans lack.
Forcing an individual to give up possession of these intimate writings may be
psychologically comparable to prying words from his lips. But Boyd’s reasoning was not
limited to such documents, and there was nothing intimate or personal about the
contested documents in that case—invoices for a shipment of glass. In short, Boyd rested
on a defective foundation.
Id. (footnote omitted); cf. Craig M. Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 463 (1981) (arguing “certain private communications, because
they are the physical embodiment of the mental process, should be entitled to special
protection under the fourth amendment”).
If a subpoena’s forced disclosure of documents is “comparable to prying words from [the
target’s] lips” and thus implicates Fifth Amendment interests, it is not self-evident why
protection is extended only to “intimate personal documents” like diaries. Business records,
drug cartel agreements, and a host of other written materials that may not involve intimate
subjects can be just as incriminating and testimonial as a diary for Fifth Amendment purposes.
Cf. Larry J. Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court’s
Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 397 (1977) (“Private papers clearly contain ‘testimonial’
evidence; unlike real evidence (the gun, mask, or contract) or identification evidence
(fingerprints or voice recognition), private writings derive from the mind of the accused, and
are a ‘mere physical extension of [his] thoughts and knowledge.’” (alteration in original)).
108
Uviller, supra note 44, at 329.
107
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were inseparable.”109 The Boyd Court placed no constitutional weight on the
nature of the compelled document.110
Finally, once the Justices in Boyd concluded that the Fifth Amendment
applied to the facts, they eschewed a balancing analysis that weighed the
government’s interests in effective law enforcement against the individual’s
interest not to be compelled to incriminate himself.111 This is exactly the sort of
analysis that the modern Court has avoided. Thus, it was plausible to read Boyd
as preventing the government from obtaining documents owned or possessed by
persons or businesses pursuant to a subpoena.112 Such a rule would stop many
white-collar investigations before they could begin. “In other words: no
documents, no case.”113 This stance certainly has significant costs. As William
Stuntz has noted, “Boyd’s reasoning had potentially huge effects on business
regulation.”114 Practically speaking, the upshot of Boyd meant that the
government could not have enforced record keeping requirements,115 which may
explain why the Court subsequently created a “required records” exception to
109
Rothman, supra note 15, at 393; cf. Stuntz, supra note 54, at 427 n.146 (“Even if one
treated corporations and natural persons differently for some purposes, however, it was hard
to justify treating them differently for purposes of Boyd, which itself involved documents used
in the course of running a business.”).
110
Heidt, supra note 43, at 446 (“In fact, th[e] invoice had not been prepared by the
[Boyds], but by the sellers, the Union Plate and Glass Company. Moreover, a statute required
the partnership to keep the invoice and to present it at the customs office when the glass was
imported. In short, the invoice related only to business matters, had not been authored by
either of the two partners subpoenaed or by their employees, had previously been revealed to
public officials and had been prepared and kept pursuant to a statutory requirement.” (footnote
omitted)).
111
Rothman, supra note 15, at 393 (“If the scope of fifth amendment protection is to be
defined in some general fashion by balancing state and individual interests, it is significant
that Boyd pays virtually no attention to the former.”).
112
See Heidt, supra note 43, at 449 (“Logically, Boyd would suppress property owned by
corporations as well as by natural persons.”); Henning, Testing the Limits, supra note 45, at
416 (“If taken to its logical extreme, Boyd would prevent the government from obtaining any
documents that qualified as the property of the person subpoenaed, including a corporation,
because of the recognition that their entity has certain property rights under the
Constitution.”); Peter J. Henning, Finding What Was Lost: Sorting Out the Custodian’s
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination from the Compelled Production of Records, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 34, 45 (1998) [hereinafter Henning, Finding What Was Lost] (“Taken at face value,
Boyd’s broad interpretation of the constitutional privacy right would make it virtually
impossible to force any person to surrender records in a government investigation.”).
113
Uviller, supra note 44, at 334.
114
Stuntz, supra note 54, at 424.
115
Id. (“If people could not be forced to disclose records because they might have violated
a record-keeping rule, the government could not have record-keeping rules, at least not
meaningful ones. And if requiring the keeping of records was impermissible, a good deal of
regulation would be, in practical terms, impermissible as well. Meanwhile, more direct
disclosure—asking someone to turn over documents in order to show whether the suspect had
violated some conduct rule—was barred by Boyd itself. . . . Nor was oral testimony an
acceptable substitute, because its use would violate the privilege against self-incrimination.”).
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the Fifth Amendment in 1948.116 While these arguments were not addressed by
the Justices in Boyd, one can imagine the Court responding that the Fifth
Amendment is worth the costs.117
Within a decade after the announcement of Boyd, the Court would decide two
more Fifth Amendment cases that would make it harder to investigate and
prosecute white-collar criminal cases. Charles Counselman, the sole member of
Charles Counselman & Co., was a grain merchant in Chicago.118 He received a
subpoena from a federal grand jury investigating whether Chicago-area railroads
were conducting illegal price discrimination in violation of the Interstate
Commerce Act.119 Counselman was asked, inter alia, whether he had received
favorable price quotes to ship grain into Chicago.120 Counselman took the
Fifth.121 After being held in contempt for refusing to answer this and other
questions from the grand jury, Counselman appealed to the Court.122
Interestingly, at the Court, the government conceded that the common law
privilege offered greater protection than the Fifth Amendment. According to the
government, under the common law “a witness in any case in any court was
entitled to refuse to answer where the answer would have a tendency to criminate
him.”123 But the government insisted that the Framers “intended to limit and
qualify the common law rule.”124 Reading the amendment literally, the
government argued that the privilege only protects a person who is called to
testify in a criminal trial. In other words, a person can only plead the Fifth in his
own criminal prosecution. A grand jury inquiry, the government lectured, “is in
no sense ‘a criminal case’” within the words of the amendment.125
The Court was not persuaded. In response, a unanimous Court in Counselman
v. Hitchcock announced two significant holdings. First, writing for the Court,
Justice Blatchford took issue with the government’s view that the words of the
amendment did not cover Counselman’s case: “The matter under investigation
by the grand jury in this case was a criminal matter, to inquire whether there had

116
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (“[T]he ‘required records’ doctrine
which this Court approved as applied to non-corporate businessmen in the state cases would
appear equally applicable in the case at bar.”).
117
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (“[C]onstitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”).
118
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 548 (1892).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 549.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 552.
123
Id. 553-54.
124
Id. at 554.
125
Id.
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been a criminal violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.”126 Further, Justice
Blatchford explained that the protection provided by the privilege extends
beyond its literal words. The point of the amendment
was to insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a
witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show
that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal
matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.127
Of course, this reasoning and holding followed Boyd’s logic that the Fifth
Amendment would not be read narrowly.
Second, Counselman rejected the government’s position on the type of
immunity required by the Fifth Amendment to force a witness to testify. The
Interstate Commerce Act provided that Counselman’s compelled testimony to
the grand jury could not be used against him in a later criminal prosecution.128
Counselman argued that this degree of immunity was constitutionally deficient
because it did not extend complete or absolute immunity from future
prosecution.129 The government countered that such a requirement “would
nullify most investigations instituted under legislative authority.”130 Again, the
Court was unconvinced by the government’s view of the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Blatchford explained that an immunity law, in order to conform with the
privilege, “must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
offence to which the question relates.”131 Citing Boyd as support, he noted that
the immunity offered to Counselman did not prevent the government from using
his compelled testimony to gain knowledge about the details of the crimes or
from locating sources of information that would assist the government in
prosecuting Counselman.132 Put in plain terms, the federal law barred direct use
of a witness’s compelled testimony but did not preclude the government from
making derivative use of the forced testimony.133
Congress responded to Counselman by enacting a new immunity law under
the Interstate Commerce Act, which provided a person could not be prosecuted

126

Id. at 562.
Id.
128
See id.
129
See id. at 558-59.
130
Id. at 559.
131
Id. at 586.
132
Id. (explaining that immunity provided by Interstate Commerce Act “affords no
protection against that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a
knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may supply other
means of convicting the witness or party”).
133
The federal immunity law protected witnesses like Counselman against the use of his
testimony in a later prosecution. However, such immunity would not “prevent the use of his
testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him . . . . It could not
prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion.” Id. at 564.
127
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for any transaction related to testimony compelled by a subpoena.134 In 1896, a
divided Court in Brown v. Walker135 ruled that transactional immunity satisfied
the Fifth Amendment.136 One interesting aspect of Brown was that the Court
split over whether transactional or absolute immunity was even constitutional.
The majority found it was because otherwise enforcement of the Interstate
Commerce Act would be impossible.137 The dissenters, taking the words of the
privilege literally—“no person should be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself”—believed the Fifth Amendment meant what it said:
Congress cannot compel a person to be a witness against himself.138 Three
dissenting Justices believed that the point of the privilege was “not merely that
every person should have such immunity, but that his right thereto should not be
divested or impaired by any act of Congress.”139
Writing for himself, Justice Field’s dissent contended that the Fifth
Amendment provided “absolute protection” not only “against the compulsory
enforcement of any criminating testimony against himself,” but also protection
“relating to any act which may lead to a criminal prosecution therefor.”140
Transactional immunity was not sufficient “because the statute does not purport
to abrogate the offence, but only provides protection against any proceeding to
punish it.”141 That is not enough, because the Fifth Amendment gives “the shield
of absolute silence.”142

134

See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 629 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting) (discussing
immunity law passed by Congress).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 610 (“While the constitutional provision in question is justly regarded as one of
the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory
immunity, and we are, therefore, of opinion that the witness was compellable to
answer . . . .”).
137
See id. Of course, the fact that transactional immunity would promote the needs of the
government would seem to be constitutionally irrelevant if the Court was truly focused on the
text of the Fifth Amendment, which speaks in absolute terms about compelling incriminating
testimony. “In short, [Brown] declared that if legislative acts could not be enforced without
violating the Constitution, then the Constitution would have to be violated to uphold those
acts.” Richard Harris, Annals of Law: Taking the Fifth, NEW YORKER MAG., Apr. 12, 1976, at
70.
138
Brown, 161 U.S. at 610 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 630 (Field, J., dissenting).
141
Id. at 636.
142
Id. at 631. While acknowledging that the Fifth Amendment could be interpreted in the
way proposed by the dissenters, according to the majority, the upshot of a literal reading of
the amendment would mean that Congress could never secure a person’s testimony “unless
[the individual] chose to [give it].” Id. at 595. On the other hand, if the point of the Fifth is to
ensure that no criminal prosecution is possible after compelling a person’s testimony,
transactional immunity—which acts “as a complete pardon for the offence to which it
relates”—“satisf[ies] the demands of the [privilege].” Id.

1550

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1523

A.

The End of Boyd v. United States (1886) and the Emergence of Hale v.
Henkel (1906)
Boyd was undoubtedly “a victory for powerful business interests.”143 When
combined with Counselman, Boyd made investigating and prosecuting corporate
officers difficult.144 But by judicial standards, it would not take long for the
Court to cabin Boyd’s frail logic—especially its application to newly emerging
corporations and business trusts. In 1906, the Court took an important step to
limit—some would say dispatch—Boyd in Hale v. Henkel.145 When read
carefully, Hale announced a narrow holding.146 However, Hale—like Boyd—
was poorly written and lacked tight legal analysis. As a result, it could be, and
was, interpreted broadly. By the end of the twentieth century—as Justice Alito
noted in 1986—Hale and its progeny would be interpreted as not only denying
corporations Fifth Amendment protection but also stripping representatives of
collective entities—natural persons—of their rights under the Fifth
Amendment.147
At the start of the twentieth century, MacAndrews & Forbes Co. controlled
the importation of licorice into America, an essential ingredient in the making
of tobacco.148 MacAndrews & Forbes, along with several other companies, was
affiliated with the American Tobacco Company, “the ring-leader of the powerful
Tobacco Trust.”149
On April 28, 1905, a federal grand jury sitting in Manhattan issued a subpoena
duces tecum to Edwin F. Hale, secretary and treasurer of MacAndrews &
Forbes.150 The subpoena ordered Hale to bring all written understandings,
agreements, correspondence, contracts, letters, and documents concerning
MacAndrews & Forbes and six other companies involved with the American
Tobacco Company.151 Hale was not the target of federal prosecutor Henry
Waters Taft, who was in charge of the Manhattan grand jury.152 President
Seventy-five years later, in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Court ruled
that transactional immunity was not required to displace a person’s Fifth Amendment right.
“Use immunity” was sufficient to override the protection provided by the Fifth. Id. at 458.
143
Alito, supra note 47, at 36.
144
See Stuntz, supra note 54, at 427 (“Boyd and Counselman made it much harder to
punish corporate officers.”).
145
201 U.S. 43 (1906); see Stuntz, supra note 54, at 430 (asserting after Hale, “notion of
any Boyd-type of protection for corporations, whether grounded in the Fourth Amendment or
the Fifth, was dead”).
146
See Hale, 201 U.S. at 77.
147
Alito, supra note 47, at 66.
148
Henry W. Taft, The Tobacco Trust Decisions, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 377 (1906).
149
WINKLER, supra note 4, at 161.
150
Hale, 201 U.S. at 44-45.
151
Id. at 45.
152
Taft, an accomplished attorney and an expert in antitrust law, was the younger brother
of William Howard Taft, who would later become President of the United States and Chief
Justice of the United States. WINKLER, supra note 4, at 163.
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Theodore Roosevelt’s Administration had initiated a high-profile investigation
of alleged Sherman Antitrust Act violations by tobacco companies.153 The real
target was the Tobacco Trust and J.B. Duke, the founder of the American
Tobacco Company. Hale was summoned to testify with the aim that he “would
prove a wellspring of information on MacAndrews & Forbes’s anticompetitive
practices. . . . Taft was going after MacAndrews & Forbes to get Buck Duke.”154
As was the case when Charles Counselman and Theodore Brown were
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, federal law granted immunity to Hale
for his testimony and production of corporate documents.155 Nevertheless, Hale
refused to supply the requested documents. He was held in contempt and sent to
jail.156 When Hale’s case arrived at the Court, several issues concerning the
privilege were in the mix.157 However, Justice Brown’s opinion for the majority
did a poor job separating and addressing those issues.158
The government’s position was plain. Relying upon a literal interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment, the government argued that Hale had no right to invoke
the privilege on behalf of a corporation because the Fifth Amendment only
protects persons, not corporations.159 The government further submitted that the
text of the amendment “does not include corporations, as the mischief intended
to be reached did not apply to corporations.”160 Ultimately, according to the
153

See id. at 172-73.
Id. at 173.
155
Hale, 201 U.S. at 46.
156
Id.
157
Some Fourth Amendment issues were in the mix as well, including whether “the Fourth
Amendment was . . . intended to interfere with the power of courts to compel, through a
subpoena duces tecum, the production, upon a trial in court, of documentary evidence,” and
whether “an order for the production of books and papers [by a corporation] may constitute
an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 76. Hale ruled that
corporations were protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 76 (“[W]e do not wish to be
understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth
Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). The scope of Fourth Amendment
protection for corporations and others subject to subpoenas for documents is beyond the scope
of this Article. Suffice it to say, however, that under current law, the Fourth Amendment gives
scant protection against a subpoena seeking business or other documents. See CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 140 (2007); Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV.
805, 808 (2005).
158
See WINKLER, supra note 4, at 185-86 (“[Justice ]Brown’s opinion was hardly a model
of clarity and has confused readers ever since. . . . [Justice] Brown’s opinion in the Hale case
has never prompted anyone to argue he was underrated.”). Ten years earlier, Justice Brown
had authored the Court’s ruling upholding state-imposed racial segregation of railroad
passengers. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
159
Hale, 201 U.S. at 57 (finding that officer of corporation must produce books of
company even though books may incriminate corporation because “one of its officers may
not assert in its behalf the privilege secured to persons by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution”).
160
Id. at 58.
154
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government, “the privilege is personal and is based upon the consideration of
the law for the individual in his capacity as a witness.”161
Justice Brown’s opinion would ultimately affirm Hale’s contempt order, but
his opinion was at times confusing and needlessly expansive.162 First, regarding
Hale’s refusal to answer certain questions posed to him by the grand jury on the
ground that he might incriminate himself, Justice Brown correctly explained that
Hale had no Fifth Amendment complaint because he was given immunity for
his testimony and production of corporate documents. “[I]f the criminality has
already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to apply.”163
Next, the defense contended that though the immunity law protected Hale, it
did not protect MacAndrews & Forbes, of which Hale was the agent and
representative.164 Justice Brown’s response was straightforward:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate
himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended
to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated
by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person.165
Although Justice Brown’s conclusion—that the privilege is a personal right
that cannot be invoked on behalf of third persons—was generally sound, this
conclusion has complications when the third party is a corporation like
MacAndrews & Forbes. As one commentator noted when Hale was announced,
a corporation can only be questioned or examined through the testimony or acts
of production of one of its officers: “The rights of the corporation could be
asserted, on its behalf, only by such an officer.”166 When an officer asserts the
rights of a corporation, he is
not seeking to invoke the privilege for the benefit of a third person, but the
corporation itself claims its own privilege in the only manner and by the
only method it can do so. The corporation was a witness impersonated in
and speaking through Hale. His voice was its voice. The privilege he set up
was its privilege. He was there in no individual or personal capacity, but
was, in a real sense and substantial sense, the corporation itself, its alter

161
Id. The government did, however, concede a conflict among the cases in America and
England on whether a corporate officer may assert the privilege on behalf of a corporation.
See id.
162
Id. at 77. McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90 (1906), was a companion case to Hale.
McAlister was the secretary and a director of the American Tobacco Company. He refused to
answer the grand jury’s questions or to produce corporate documents for the same reasons
asserted by Hale. The Court concluded that McAlister’s Fifth Amendment claims were
controlled by Hale. See id. at 90-91.
163
Hale, 201 U.S. at 67.
164
Id. at 69.
165
Id. at 69-70.
166
Paul A. Moses, Corporate Self-Incrimination (A Critical Analysis of Hale v. Henkel),
32 NAT’L CORP. REP. 349, 349 (1906).
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ego, which, through him, asserted its constitutional rights. If it cannot so
assert them through him, it can never assert them at all.167
Recognizing this reality, and perhaps anticipating a future case, Justice Brown
explicitly stated, “The question whether a corporation is a ‘person’ within the
meaning of [the Fifth] Amendment really does not arise . . . .”168 This is where
Justice Brown should have ended his opinion.169 Enough had been written to
resolve Hale’s Fifth Amendment claims. There was no need to say more. But he
kept writing.
Four pages later Justice Brown opined that if Hale could refuse to produce
corporate documents on the ground that the documents would incriminate the
corporation, that “would result in the failure of a large number of cases where
the illegal combination was determinable only upon the examination of such
papers.”170 Analogizing to a state’s reserve power of visitation to examine and
regulate a corporation’s activities, Justice Brown found that Congress had
equivalent authority, under its Article I Commerce Clause powers, to regulate
corporations and that corporate interests “must also be exercised in
subordination” to the powers of Congress.171 In other words, permitting Hale to
invoke the Fifth on behalf of the corporation would undermine law enforcement
goals and make enforcing federal antitrust law difficult or impossible.
Even more perplexing and unnecessary was Justice Brown’s next assertion:
Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation under
investigation, and that he was entitled to assert the rights of the corporation
with respect to the production of its books and papers, we are of the opinion
that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and
a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books
and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. . . . While an
individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless
protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand
when charged with an abuse of such privileges.172

167

Id.
Hale, 201 U.S. at 70.
169
See Moses, supra note 166, at 349 (“The actual decision was, that the witness, though
an officer of the corporation, was not entitled to claim for his corporation that the corporation
would be incriminated, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, by his being compelled to
produce its books and papers, and forced to testify respecting its business. . . . This is the crux
of the decision.”).
170
Hale, 201 U.S. at 74. Justice Brown made a similar point when discussing the
prosecution’s need for Hale’s oral testimony. Id. at 70 (“As the combination or conspiracies
provided against by the Sherman Anti Trust Act can ordinarily be proved only by the
testimony of parties thereto, in the person of their agents or employés [sic], the privilege
claimed would practically nullify the whole act of Congress.”).
171
Id. at 75.
172
Id. at 74-75.
168
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This discussion on the Fifth Amendment rights of corporations was confusing
and contradictory. Not only was the above quoted passage unnecessary in light
of Justice Brown’s earlier reservation that the Court was not deciding whether a
corporation was a “person” under the Fifth Amendment, it resolves the issue—
in favor of the government—the Court supposedly left open.173 Denying a
corporation Fifth Amendment protection also seemed to conflict with previous
Court rulings concluding that a corporation was a “person” within the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.174
In the final analysis, as understood by lawyers and policy makers in 1906,
Hale was an extremely important ruling.175 It marked a clear departure from the
constitutional direction announced in Boyd.176 Hale gave Congress more power
to regulate and investigate corporations engaged in interstate commerce than had
previously been imagined.177 Put simply, it gave federal authorities “a potent
weapon to compel obedience to the law.”178 And, regarding the rights of
representatives of collective entities, Hale signaled that the Court would
delineate the rights of corporate officers from the rights of the corporations that
employed them.179 At the same time, it did not go unnoticed that Hale proffered
173

Professor Henning notes that under Hale’s logic, the corporation and its agents are
separate entities, and because the corporation did not testify, it could not invoke the Fifth.
Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 47, at 818-19 (“This analysis permitted
the Court to avoid deciding whether a corporation was a ‘person’ protected by the SelfIncrimination Clause because the company itself was not asserting the Fifth Amendment
protection . . . . [T]he end result of the decision was that a corporation is incapable of ever
insisting on the Fifth Amendment right because it could not speak except through its agents.”).
174
Hale, 201 U.S. at 84-85 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the word ‘person’ in th[e]
[Fourteenth] Amendment includes corporations, it also includes corporations when used in
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”).
175
Writing contemporaneously to Hale, one commentator described the decision as “one
of the most momentous and far-reaching in its present and ultimate consequences, that has
even been made by that august tribunal.” Moses, supra note 166, at 349. Another attorney
close to the action noted that “[t]he importance and far-reaching effect of the decision cannot
be overestimated.” Taft, supra note 148, at 383.
176
Cf. Taft, supra note 148, at 385 (arguing that when Hale is read in conjunction with
decisions in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), and Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904), it seems “to make the decision in the Boyd case rest alone upon
the Fifth Amendment and prevent the extension of the Fourth Amendment beyond the limits
justified by its historical and political origin”).
177
See id. at 383 (stating that Hale “must inevitably result in making the subjection of
State corporations engaged in interstate trade to the authority of the national government much
more complete than it has hitherto been”).
178
Id. at 386.
179
See WINKLER, supra note 4, at 187-88 (“[Justice Brown] approached the corporation as
an independent legal actor, separate and distinct from the members who composed
it. . . . Although Hale was called [to testify] as an agent of the corporation, Brown saw a strict
separation between the corporate entity and its members—including, in this case, its
employees.”).
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“a result-oriented rationale, justifying its holding on the ground that permitting
a corporation to assert the privilege ‘would result in the failure of a large number
of cases where the illegal combination was determinable only upon the
examination of such papers.’”180 This way of thinking about the Fifth
Amendment would continue throughout the twentieth century.
B.

Wilson v. United States (1911): No Fifth Amendment Rights for
Corporate Officers

In June 1910, Christopher Columbus Wilson was president of the United
Wireless Telegraph Company.181 Wilson was a colorful character. Born in
Mississippi in 1845, several newspaper accounts described Wilson as “a
financier of the self-made school,”182 who “never had more than three months
of schooling.”183 Wilson was a successful cotton farmer, a banker in Denver, a
miner, and finally, a promoter of wireless securities in New York City.
According to the press, Wilson lived at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel when in New
York City.184
A federal grand jury was investigating United Wireless in 1910.185 On August
3, two indictments were returned against Wilson and other officers of the
company.186 On October 7, the grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to the
company requiring its appearance before the grand jury and production of a letter

Professor Henning views Hale as a compromise decision. “[T]he Court chose the
Solomonic approach . . . denying protection under the Fifth Amendment while recognizing
some measure of protection under the Fourth Amendment.” Henning, Corporate Criminal
Liability, supra note 47, at 818 (arguing that according normal Fourth and Fifth Amendment
protection to corporations would make “investigation of a corporation’s crimes virtually
impossible[,]” while completely denying constitutional protections “might be too extreme
because the Court had frequently recognized that corporations were persons or citizens under
other provisions of the Constitution”). Henning, however, concedes that Hale “failed to
explain why corporations should be treated differently under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments” nor explained “why a corporation could assert only a Fourth Amendment right
that the Court in Boyd said was intimately related to the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 820. The
text of the two amendments certainly does not justify the “discordant treatment of the
corporation in criminal proceedings.” Id. at 796.
180
Henning, Finding What Was Lost, supra note 112, at 46 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 74 (1906)).
181
Raid Wireless, Arrest Three: Frauds of Millions in Stock Alleged, BOS. DAILY GLOBE,
June 16, 1910, at 5.
182
Id.; United Wireless Offices Raided: President and Two Others Are Arrested on Charge
of Alleged Fraud, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 16, 1910, at 13.
183
Charge Huge Fraud: Postal Inspectors Arrest United Wireless Head, WASH. POST,
June 16, 1910, at 1.
184
See id.
185
Put Col. Wilson in a Tombs Cell: United Wireless President Committed by Judge
Lacombe for Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1910, at 5.
186
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 367 (1911).
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press copy book belonging to the company.187 Wilson was served with the
subpoena as president of the company, as were other directors of the company.188
Wilson appeared before the grand jury, but he invoked the Fifth and refused to
produce the letter press copy book.189 The other directors told the grand jury that
the company was not resisting the grand jury request and wanted Wilson to
produce the letter press copy book, which they claimed Wilson possessed.190
When Wilson’s contempt ordered was upheld by a lower court, he sought relief
in the Supreme Court.191
The facts left no doubt that Wilson was the target of a criminal
investigation.192 And by early twentieth century legal standards, Wilson asserted
a compelling Fifth Amendment claim. Wigmore’s 1905 treatise stated “where
the corporate misconduct involves also the claimant’s misconduct, or where the
document is in reality the personal act of the claimant, though nominally that of
the corporation, its disclosures are virtually his own, and to that extent his
privilege protects him from producing them.”193 British cases applying the
common law privilege ruled that corporate officers or employees could refuse
to disclose corporate documents.194 The same principle was embraced by
American courts. “No court in the years immediately following Hale thought the
Supreme Court had upset the law in this regard; corporate officers and
employees, if called upon to produce incriminating corporate documents in their
187

Id. at 367-68.
Id.
189
After Wilson was ruled in contempt for failure to produce the letter press copy book,
he told reporters outside of the jail that he did not know the contents of the book. Put Col.
Wilson in a Tombs Cell, supra note 185 (“I don’t know what’s in it myself. I’ll put it in
evidence on the trial, but I don’t propose to let the Government get it now to use on a fishing
excursion.”). He even offered reporters who had followed him to the jail to take a look:
“Boys . . . there’s the book. You can all of you look in it if you like, for is it just one of my
letter books.” Id.
190
Id.
191
Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911), was a companion case to Wilson. The
only notable difference between Dreier and Wilson was that the federal grand jury subpoena
was issued directly to Dreier, who was the custodian of the corporate papers, whereas in
Wilson the subpoena was issued to the company. Dreier, 221 U.S. at 400; Wilson, 221 U.S.
at 362. That difference was constitutionally irrelevant. Dreier, 221 U.S. at 400.
192
Wilson, 221 U.S. at 387 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (“Three indictments had already
been found against him. Crime, therefore, had been formally charged, and further crime was
being investigated—not crime by the corporation, but crime by him, and the proof, it was
supposed, lay in the books. They were sought for no other reason. They were demanded of
him to convict him.”).
193
WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2259.
194
Rothman, supra note 15, at 405-06 (“Virtually every precedent said the same thing:
Witnesses required to produce corporate books and records that were self-incriminating could
refuse to comply. This principle was established in England by the middle of the eighteenth
century. . . . [T]he rule had become well-enough established in England by the nineteenth
century to be recited in popular treatises of the day and applied in at least one reported case
involving a recognizably modern business corporation.”).
188
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legitimate possession, could refuse to comply on fifth amendment grounds.”195
Put another way, where a person was facing an imminent prosecution and
compelled to reveal incriminating evidence against himself, he could invoke his
own personal privilege. Even if one thought the dicta from Hale regarding a
corporation’s lack of standing to invoke the privilege was sound, Hale did not
diminish the Fifth Amendment rights of individuals.
Wilson’s lawyers told the Justices that the privilege permitted Wilson to
withhold corporate documents in his possession because those documents would
incriminate him.196 Wilson was invoking his own privilege, not the privilege of
United Wireless. A majority of the Court rejected this argument and explained
that “the physical custody of incriminating documents does not of itself protect
the custodian against their compulsory production.”197 Instead of emphasizing
who possessed the documents or whether production of the documents had
testimonial qualities, as Wigmore argued was important,198 the Court focused on
“the nature of the documents and the capacity in which they are held.”199 If the
contested documents are entity documents—and not personal papers—then “the
custodian has voluntarily assumed a duty which overrides his claim of
privilege.”200 In other words, by becoming president of the company, Wilson
had waived his Fifth Amendment right.
When these criteria were applied to Wilson’s case, the result was predictable.
The letter press copy book was a corporate document; thus, Wilson was required

195

Id. at 408.
During the grand jury proceedings, Wilson submitted a written statement contending
that the letter press copy book contained a mixture of personal and corporate papers. Wilson,
221 U.S. at 368. Justice Hughes’s opinion for the majority made clear that the subpoena
sought only corporate documents. Id. at 377 (“The copies of letters written by the president
of the corporation in the course of its transactions were as much a part of its documentary
property, subject to its control and to its duty to produce when lawfully required in judicial
proceedings, as its ledgers and minute books.”). Justice Hughes did acknowledge that
Wilson’s private papers were protected, citing Boyd, but emphasized “his personal letters
were not demanded; these the subpoena did not seek to reach; and as to these no question of
violation of privilege is presented.” Id. at 377-78. The fact that Wilson may have commingled
some of his private papers with corporate papers could not convert the latter into
constitutionally protected papers.
197
Id. at 380.
198
WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2264 (stating it “is universally conceded” that production
of documents by person in response to subpoena may be resisted and is protected by
privilege). Wigmore acknowledged that production of documents pursuant to a subpoena did
not require oral testimony, and though such documents were
already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by a testimonial of the
process in response to the [subpoena], still no line can be drawn short of any process
which treats him as a witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to
make oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the articles produced.
Id.
199
Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380.
200
Id.
196
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to produce it. Perhaps to bolster his holding, Justice Hughes noted that “the
corporation has no privilege to refuse. It cannot refuse production upon the
ground of self-incrimination.”201 This was a curious comment because United
Wireless was not resisting the subpoena and Wilson was not invoking the
privilege on behalf of the corporation.
Of course, Hale had reserved the question of whether a corporation is a
“person” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and no corporation in
Wilson was invoking the privilege.202 Thus, repeating Hale’s dicta that a
corporation has no right to invoke the Fifth was pointless, and it did not fortify
Wilson’s holding.203 For good measure, Justice Hughes opined that if Wilson
could refuse to disclose corporate records, the “reserved power of visitation
would seriously be embarrassed, if not wholly defeated in its effective
exercise.”204 Wilson’s “personal privilege” did not require that result; indeed,
such a result—undermining the state’s power of visitation—would be “an
unjustifiable extension” of Wilson’s “personal right[].”205 But Justice Hughes
then immediately added that corporate officers “may decline to utter upon the
witness stand a single self-incrimination word.”206 Justice Hughes did not bother
explaining why allowing corporate officers to invoke the Fifth when forced to
provide oral testimony did not equally embarrass or defeat the state’s visitatorial
powers over corporations and their officers.
Finally, Justice Hughes saw no significance in the fact that the grand jury
inquiry “was not directed against the corporation itself.”207 Wilson had “no
greater right to withhold the books by reason of the fact that the corporation was
not charged with criminal abuses.”208 Though Wilson had physical custody over
the documents, they belonged to the corporation. Thus, Wilson “could assert no
personal right to retain the corporate books against any demand of government
which the corporation was bound to recognize.”209 Determining the scope of
Fifth Amendment protection with a property-centric focus “was consistent with
201

Id. at 382.
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1905).
203
Fourteen days after Wilson was decided, the Court decided Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612 (1911), which addressed, inter alia,
whether the Interstate Commerce Commission required railroads to make and disclose reports
regarding the hours of labor of its employees. At the end of his opinion, Justice Hughes ruled
that the Fifth Amendment posed no barrier to the making and disclosure of such reports
because a corporation cannot plead a privilege against self-incrimination, citing Hale and
Wilson for the principle that “officers of the corporation, by virtue of the assumption of their
duties as such, are bound by the corporate obligation and cannot claim a personal privilege in
hostility to the requirement.” Id. at 623 (citing Wilson, 221 U.S. at 361).
204
Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-85.
205
Id. at 385.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
202
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the property-rights approach taken in Boyd”210 but conflicted with the reasoning
of Hale which drew “a clear distinction” between a corporate officer and the
corporation that employed him.211
Read dispassionately, Hale did not control Wilson.212 Ultimately, the crucial
reasoning in Wilson was the Court’s conclusion that when a person accepts
employment with a corporation, he “voluntarily assume[s] a duty which
overrides his claim of privilege,” and the fact that the subpoenaed documents
were corporate property.213 Justice Hughes may have injected a dose of
confusion when he noted the Court was not addressing whether oral testimony
could be compelled from someone in Wilson’s shoes,214 especially when he later
stated a corporate officer could not be compelled to provide oral testimony.215
While Hale’s holding did not control Wilson, the motivation behind Wilson was
the same motivation behind Hale: namely, that interpreting the Fifth
Amendment to permit someone in Wilson’s shoes to invoke the privilege would
stymie law enforcement.216
C.

Wheeler v. United States (1913)

The result in Wilson was a “marked departure” from the protection offered by
the common law privilege217 and was an obvious and significant extension of
Hale’s understanding of how the Fifth Amendment applied in the corporate

210

Foster, supra note 54, at 1611.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906) (“While an individual may lawfully refuse
to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow
that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand
when charged with an abuse of such privileges.”).
212
See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 390 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (“What privilege an officer of
the corporation had from producing the books on the ground that they might criminate him
was not necessary to decide [in Hale], as immunity from prosecution was given by statute for
any matter as to which he should testify. It may be contended that it is a natural inference
from [Hale] that but for the immunity granted he could have claimed such privilege.”).
213
Id. at 380; cf. Heier, supra note 14, at 77 (asserting Wilson was “based on the familiar
Trinity principle, a corporate officer was merely a custodian of someone else’s books and
records and could assert no privilege despite the fact that the contents of the books tended to
incriminate him”).
214
See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 377 (“There is no question, of course, of oral testimony, for he
was not required to give any.”).
215
Id. at 385 (stating corporate officers “may demand that any accusation against them
individually be established without the aid of their oral testimony or the compulsory
production by them of their private papers”).
216
Compare Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-85 (“The reserved power of visitation would be
seriously be embarrassed, if not wholly defeated in its effective exercise, if guilty officers
could refuse inspection of the records and papers of the corporation.”), with Hale, 201 U.S. at
74 (noting that if corporate officers could refuse to produce corporate papers by invoking
privilege on behalf of corporation, “it would result in the failure of a large number of cases
where the illegal combination was determinable only upon the examination of such papers”).
217
See Corwin I, supra note 62, at 17 n.39.
211
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context. Two years later in Wheeler v. United States,218 the Court constricted the
Fifth Amendment even further.219
In April 1911, the corporation Wheeler & Shaw, Inc., was dissolved.220 Upon
dissolution, all of the papers and books belonging to the company were lawfully
transferred to Warren B. Wheeler and Stillman Shaw, the former treasurer and
president, respectively, of the corporation.221 On April 12, a federal grand jury
sitting in Boston served a subpoena duces tecum on Wheeler and Shaw, in their
capacity as officers of the firm.222 The grand jury was investigating whether
Wheeler and Shaw had committed mail fraud and sought all of the company’s
books and papers covering the period from October 1, 1909, to January 1,
1911.223 Wheeler and Shaw conceded possession of the sought documents but
argued that because the company was dissolved and the documents were
rightfully possessed by them personally, compulsory production of the books
violated the Fifth Amendment.224 They lost in the lower court and then appealed
to the Court.
In three brief paragraphs, a unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Day,
ruled that Wilson controlled and rejected the defendants’ Fifth Amendment
claims.225 Concededly, the corporation was dissolved, “but its books and papers
were still in existence and were still impressed with the incidents attending
corporate documents.”226 And yes, after dissolution, the documents belonged to
the defendants, “but this did not change the essential character of the books and
papers or make them any more privileged in the investigation of crime than they
were before.”227 Put simply, though the corporation was gone, the defendants
were no longer corporate officers, the documents were lawfully possessed by the
defendants, and the defendants were invoking the Fifth “in order to protect what
were now their own private papers,”228 which would have been enough to trigger

218

226 U.S. 478 (1913).
See id. at 489-90 (holding that books of corporation are not private books of any of
officers, and do not become so by dissolution of corporation and transfer of books to one of
those officers).
220
Id. at 486.
221
Id. at 483, 486.
222
Id. at 482.
223
Id. at 482-83.
224
Id. at 484.
225
Id. at 489-90. Interestingly, Justice McKenna joined Justice Day’s majority opinion in
Wheeler notwithstanding his strong dissent in Wilson. One year after authoring Wheeler,
Justice Day wrote one of his more noteworthy opinions: Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). Weeks ruled that the Fourth Amendment alone forbids the admission of illegally
obtained evidence in a federal prosecution. See id. at 398; MACLIN, supra note 92, at 8.
226
Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 489-90.
227
Id. at 490.
228
Heier, supra note 14, at 77 n.39.
219

2021]

LONG OVERDUE

1561

constitutional protection under Boyd, Justice Day concluded “the character of
the books” had not changed for Fifth Amendment purposes.229
Just as Wilson extended Hale, Wheeler extended Wilson. Wilson emphasized
that the corporation owned the subpoenaed documents to reject Wilson’s
invocation of the privilege. In Wheeler, Wheeler and Shaw owned the
subpoenaed documents, but the Court found that fact constitutionally irrelevant
and instead focused on the corporate character of the documents to deny the
claim of privilege.
Wheeler’s ipse dixit holding drew no support from Wilson because “logically
speaking, the books could no longer belong to a corporation that no longer
existed.”230 And the other prong of Wilson’s holding—that corporate officers
voluntarily waive their privilege by taking the job—was not utilized in Wheeler
for good reason. Wilson’s waiver theory was itself manufactured from whole
cloth; it was not based on precedent or constitutional principle. Extending
Wilson’s waiver theory to Wheeler was a bridge too far. It would require
embracing the principle that a person who formerly worked for a corporation
that no longer exists has implicitly agreed to waive their privilege against selfincrimination when targeted for a criminal investigation based on a duty that
ceases to be applicable.231
Invoking Wilson as support for the result in Wheeler was disingenuous. The
legal basis for denying the claim of privilege in Wilson was flimsy at best. “But
it becomes totally unjustified when applied to a post-dissolution situation on the
basis of an obscure notion about the inherent quality of corporate books,”232
especially when the books no longer belong to the corporation and the
government’s visitorial power over the corporation is imaginary.233

229

Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 490.
Heier, supra note 14, at 77.
231
See Alito, supra note 47, at 67 n.176 (commenting that Wilson’s waiver theory was not
used in Wheeler, perhaps because that would have required holding that waiver theory
“survived corporate dissolution” and “[t]he [Wheeler] Court may have felt that this
controversial theory could not be stretched that far”).
232
Heier, supra note 14, at 79.
233
Two weeks after Wheeler was decided, the Court applied Wheeler’s holding to the
records of a dissolved corporation where the records were in the possession of the individual
who had been the corporation’s sole shareholder. Grant & Burlingame v. United States, 227
U.S. 74, 80 (1913) (explaining that regardless of whether title to documents passed to
Burlingame when firm dissolved, “their essential character was not changed,” and documents
could not have been withheld by Burlingame because they would incriminate him). The ruling
in Grant & Burlingame, like the rulings in Wilson and Wheeler, was even furthered removed
from the logic of Hale. In Hale, Justice Brown emphasized the “clear distinction” between
the corporation and its employee. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906). That difference
was razor thin in Grant & Burlingame, “but the Court did not discuss the issue. Instead, it
looked solely at the ‘essential character’ of the books as corporate documents to deny the
claim of privilege.” Foster, supra note 54, at 1612.
230
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United States v. White (1944)

Before he sat on the Court, Justice Frank Murphy, who had been Mayor of
Detroit from 1930-1933, was considered a friend of organized labor and workers
generally.234 As Governor of Michigan, Justice Murphy successfully mediated a
historic and violent strike between the United Auto Workers and General
Motors.235 As a member of the Court, it has been said that Justice Murphy
embraced a broad view of the Bill of Rights.236 On June 12, 1944, Justice
Murphy’s opinion in United States v. White237 was announced.
A federal grand jury was investigating possible union corruption in the
construction of a Naval Supply Depot in Pennsylvania, and a subpoena duces
tecum was served on the president of Local No. 542, International Union of
Operating Engineers.238 Jasper White appeared before the grand jury and
identified himself as the “assistant supervisor” of the union.239 White possessed
the subpoenaed documents but declined to disclose them because the contents
might incriminate him.240 A district court found White guilty of contempt;
however, a federal appellate court ruled that “the records of an unincorporated
labor union were the property of all its members and that, if [White] were a union
member and if the books and records would have tended to incriminate him, he
properly could refuse to produce them before the grand jury.”241 After the
government appealed this ruling, the Court reversed.242
Justice Murphy began his analysis by stating that the privilege is a personal
right “applying only to natural individuals.”243 And because the right is personal,
“it cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a

234

HAROLD NORRIS, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57 (1965).
Id. at 58.
236
Id. at 1 (describing Justice Murphy as committed “civil libertarian” and noting he used
time on Court “to record in word and deed an approach to the understanding and defense of
constitutional rights from which his countrymen and men everywhere striving for freedom
can derive ever increasing strength, direction and devotion”); J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR.,
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 490 (1968) (“Above all, his vote and
impassioned pen were key elements in a revolutionary development of civil liberties.”);
Eugene Gressman, Book Review, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1278, 1280 (1969) (reviewing J.
WOODFORD HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1968)) (“In forceful
and colorful language, [Justice Murphy] gave voice to the libertarian idealism that underlies
the Bill of Rights and that came into greater prominence in the subsequent years of the Warren
Court.”). Justice Felix Frankfurter derisively called Justice Murphy “the Saint.” HOWARD
BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 125 (1996).
237
322 U.S. 694 (1944).
238
Id. at 695.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 696.
241
Id. at 696-97; see also United States v. White, 137 F.2d 24, 26 (3d Cir. 1943).
242
White, 322 U.S. at 705.
243
Id. at 698.
235
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corporation.”244 Thus far, Justice Murphy was merely restating principles settled
since Hale and its progeny. His next point, however, was new and far-reaching:
Justice Murphy reasoned that when people act as representatives of a collective
body, they cannot rely on their personal rights—instead, they assume the duties
and obligations of the collective group.245 In that role, they have no Fifth
Amendment protection. If they possess documents of the collective group, they
hold the records in their representative capacity, and thus cannot invoke the
privilege to withhold those documents even though production of the documents
will incriminate them personally.246
To bolster his rationale for denying invocation of the privilege, Justice
Murphy stated that “the economic activities of incorporated and unincorporated
organizations and their representatives demand that the constitutional power of
the federal and state governments to regulate those activities be correspondingly
effective.”247 That the federal government lacked visitorial powers over labor
unions posed no obstacle to constricting the privilege.248 The authority to compel
production of documents from any organization stems from “the inherent and
necessary power of the federal and state governments to enforce their laws,”249
and the privilege is confined to protecting a natural person “from compulsory
incrimination through his own testimony or personal records.”250
The reasoning of White was an extraordinary expansion of government power
to investigate free of the protections the Fifth Amendment would otherwise
provide. Hale and its progeny had justified precluding invocation of the privilege
in order to vindicate the visitorial power of the state to monitor and regulate
corporations and their officers. Since the visitorial power theory was unavailable
in White, Justice Murphy simply turned to “public necessity” and the “inherent”
power of government to enforce the law.251 He offered no legal analysis
244

Id. at 699.
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 700.
248
Id. The appellate court below had concluded that the state visitorial power, so important
to the analysis of Hale and Wilson, could not be invoked to shrink the privilege because that
power was confined to examining and regulating corporate records since corporations derived
all of their powers from the state. The state had no similar power over an unincorporated
union. United States v. White, 137 F.2d 24, 27-28 (3d Cir. 1943).
249
White, 322 U.S. at 701.
250
Id.
251
Id. at 700-01. At one point in his opinion, Justice Murphy invoked the support of the
Framers of the Constitution, noting that they “cannot be said to have intended the privilege to
be available to protect economic or other interests of such organizations so as to nullify
appropriate governmental regulations.” Id. at 700. This type of legal reasoning is
embarrassing. Professor Henning politely notes that this claim is “interesting because the
framers never considered corporations in drafting the Constitution. The various protections
afforded to individuals can equally frustrate government law enforcement, yet one would
never use that as the basis for denying all constitutional protection.” Henning, Corporate
Criminal Liability, supra note 47, at 828 n.157.
245
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explaining why the purposes or policies of the privilege did not protect a natural
person like Jasper White.252
White’s status as the custodian of the documents was obviously the decisive
factor, revealing that Justice Murphy was silently adopting the waiver theory
embraced by Wilson.253 Nor did Justice Murphy proffer a neutral principle
justifying barring invocation of the privilege—other than the government’s need
for effective law enforcement, which, of course, can be utilized every time a
person takes the Fifth. In one way, however, White “was more candid than its
predecessors”254 in acknowledging the motivation behind its holding and
confessing that the collective entity rule “was in reality nothing more than a
means to accomplish a law enforcement end that the Court concluded had to be
facilitated.”255
Casually read, White’s rationale that custodians and representatives of
collective groups could not invoke the Fifth applied to a myriad of organizations
and groups. As such, it freed prosecutors and other government officials to go
on fishing expeditions to examine the records and documents of any group
subject to state or federal regulation. Perhaps to cabin this eventuality, Justice
Murphy explained that whether the Fifth Amendment can be invoked turns on
whether “a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the
scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or
represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to
embody their common or group interests only.”256 But this “test,”257 like Justice
Murphy’s other reasoning, had no nexus with the Fifth Amendment’s text or its
underlying purpose or policies. Rather, this test was keyed to privacy concerns,
but it also worked hand in hand with the Court’s long-standing desire—dating
back to Hale—to prevent the privilege from interfering with effective law
enforcement.258 Although the justifications had changed, the results were the
same. Persons were barred from invoking the Fifth in order to facilitate
252
See WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2259 (“[W]here the corporate misconduct involves also
the claimant’s misconduct, or where the document is in reality the personal act of the claimant,
though nominally that of the corporation, its disclosures are virtually his own, and to that
extent his privilege protects him producing them.”).
253
See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing origins of Wilson’s waiver
theory).
254
Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 32.
255
Id. at 34; see also Stuntz, supra note 54, at 433 n.173 (calling White “[a]n usually blunt
example” of the Court’s motivation in collective entity cases).
256
White, 322 U.S. at 701.
257
Id.
258
Cf. Rothman, supra note 15, at 419-20 (“The White test is phrased in terms of privacy,
but it follows logically from the Court’s overriding social control concerns. . . . [A]s
organizations grow in size, they become more powerful and less amenable to government
supervision and control. Social organization is the most potent of the weapons in the whitecollar criminal’s arsenal; organized, institutional activity of the kind pinpointed by the White
test is exactly the sort of nonviolent criminal activity that poses the gravest threat to the
community.” (footnote omitted)).
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enforcement of the criminal laws. Understood this way, White was following the
steps of Hale, Wilson, and Wheeler—a continuing chain down to the dangerously
limited Fifth Amendment of our own time.
The breadth of White’s reasoning and its vacuous analysis raise the question
why liberal Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Wiley Rutledge signed
Justice Murphy’s opinion.259 White’s broad rationale was especially useful to
politicians and prosecutors seeking to pry documents from left-leaning political
groups during the political witch hunts of the 1950s. When members of the
Communist Party and the Civil Rights Congress claimed the privilege to resist
subpoenas to produce organizational documents, a majority of the Court simply
cited White to remind claimants that they had “no privilege” to resist even
though disclosure of the documents was personally incriminating.260
E.

Curcio v. United States (1957): Two Types of Fifth Amendment
Testimony?

The constitutional framework established by Wilson, Wheeler, and White
could be read to mean that representatives and custodians of collective entities
implicitly waive protection of the Fifth Amendment whenever they are ordered
to disclose information regarding the collective entity—even if the disclosure is
personally incriminating. To be sure, all three cases involved scenarios where
representatives were only compelled to produce entity documents; none
involved forced oral testimony from a representative. Yet, the Court ruled the
privilege was unavailable in each case assuming that production of entity
documents would personally incriminate Wilson, Wheeler, and White. In fact, a
passage in White appeared to adopt the view that waiver of the privilege applied
across the board, not just to forced production of documents. White reasoned
that when people act as representatives of a collective body, they cannot rely on
their personal rights; instead, they assume the duties and obligations of the
259
Equally puzzling is why Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in the result.
Professor Howard has observed that Justice Murphy’s opinion contained “generous references
to older decisions supporting antitrust suits against trade unions” that caused Justice
Frankfurter to concur without an opinion. HOWARD, supra note 236, at 384. In his seminal
biography of Justice Murphy, Professor Howard noted the White opinion may have been
assigned to Justice Murphy “because of unexpected votes” among the Justices. Id. at 490.
260
See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951); McPhaul v. United States,
364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960). In Rogers, Justice Black, joined by Justices Frankfurter and
Douglas, dissented and remarked:
Some people are hostile to the Fifth Amendment’s provision unequivocally commanding
that no United States official shall compel a person to be a witness against himself. They
consider the provision as an outmoded relic of past fears generated by ancient
inquisitorial practices that could not possibly happen here. For this reason the privilege
to be silent is sometimes accepted as being more or less of a constitutional nuisance
which the courts should abate whenever and however possible.
Rogers, 340 U.S. at 375-76 (Black, J., dissenting). Despite his strong words in support of the
Fifth Amendment, Justice Black’s dissent did not question the continued validity of Wilson
or White. Id. at 375-81.
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collective group.261 “In their official capacity, therefore, they have no privilege
against self-incrimination.”262
A broad notion of waiver was certainly logical. If someone like Wilson or
White “voluntarily assumed a duty which overrides his claim of privilege,”263
regarding production of documents, why treat oral testimony differently?
Compelled production of documents from a custodian triggers the Fifth
Amendment as much as compelled oral testimony. The former can be just as
testimonial as oral testimony. Wigmore recognized this point as early as 1905.264
Contemporary scholars have reached the same conclusion: “Admissions implicit
in producing records do not lose their testimonial quality if the records belong
to a corporation rather than to an individual.”265 And if compelled production of
records is constitutionally permissible because the custodian has waived his
privilege—as Wilson, Wheeler, and White establish—the same waiver can be
used to compel oral testimony. As Wilson put it, by accepting the job as
custodian, a person “has voluntarily assumed a duty which overrides his claim
of privilege.”266 The text of the Fifth Amendment certainly does not distinguish
between types of testimony that are incriminating. Indeed, the terms “testimony”
or “oral testimony” nowhere appear in the text of the amendment, which bars a
person from being compelled in a criminal case “to be a witness against
himself.”267 Ironically, a half century later, the Court would note in a case
involving a defendant who was not an officer of a collective entity that there was
“no cogent argument as to why the ‘testimonial’ requirement should have one
meaning in the context of acts, and another meaning in the context of verbal
statements.”268
Indeed, in 1926 and 1929, two decisions from highly respected federal judges
applied Wilson’s waiver theory to certain types of oral testimony compelled

261

See White, 322 U.S. at 699.
Id.
263
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
264
WIGMORE, supra note 49, at § 2264 (“[I]t is not merely compulsion which is the kernal
of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.”).
265
King, supra note 52, at 1556. This was true even before Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976), acknowledged that the act of production can sometimes be testimonial.
WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2264(1).
266
Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380.
267
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
268
Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.8 (1988); see also Mosteller,
Cowboy Prosecutors, supra note 44, at 527 n.174 (noting distinction between “compelling
explicit speech and indirect communication through the act of production under the Fifth
Amendment, was apparently rejected by Doe II”); id. at 529 (“Because the Supreme Court
has never extensively examined the issue, some possibility remains that it may develop an
important difference in treatment between compulsion of testimony per se and compulsion of
implicit testimony through production. However, any such distinction would be very difficult
to justify under established Fifth Amendment doctrine.”).
262
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from custodians of collective entities.269 In the first case, Judge Augustus Noble
Hand, sitting as a federal district judge, ruled that corporate officers were not
entitled to statutory immunity for incriminating grand jury testimony as to the
identity of corporate documents.270 Because the officer could be forced to
disclose the documents notwithstanding their personally incriminating contents,
Judge Hand saw “little difference between testimony of the character given and
a production of the books under a subpoena without it.”271 Then, three years
later, Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, found no
constitutional infirmity when a corporate officer was called to the stand and
compelled to identify the minutes of the corporation, despite his invocation of
the privilege.272 According to Judge Learned Hand, if production can be
compelled, compelling oral testimony to authenticate the documents was equally
permissible: “[W]e think that the greater includes the less, and that, since the
production can be forced, it may be made effective by compelling the producer
to declare that the documents are genuine.”273
So matters stood when Curcio v. United States274 arrived at the Court. Joseph
Curcio, the secretary-treasurer of Local 269 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, was subpoenaed by a federal grand jury sitting in Manhattan that was
investigating racketeering in the garment and trucking industries.275 Two
subpoenas—“a personal subpoena ad testificandum and a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to [Curcio] in his capacity” as an officer of the union were served on
Curcio.276 Curcio testified that the union had the requested documents, but they
were not in his possession.277 When asked about the location of the documents,
Curcio took the Fifth, claiming that any answers regarding the whereabouts or
who possessed the documents would incriminate him.278 A federal district judge
269

United States v. Lay Fish Co., 13 F.2d 136, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); United States v.
Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1929).
270
Lay Fish Co., 13 F.2d at 136.
271
Id. at 137.
272
Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d at 233-34. Judge Learned Hand was the younger first
cousin of Judge Augustus Noble Hand. The latter was elevated to the Second Circuit by
President Calvin Coolidge and confirmed by the Senate on January 18, 1928. Burt Neuborne,
A Tale of Two Hands: One Clapping; One Not, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 831, 834, 845 (2018). Judge
Augustus Noble Hand sat on the panel with Judge Learned Hand in Austin-Bagley Corp., 31
F.2d. at 232.
273
Id. at 234; see also id. (stating “testimony auxiliary to the production is as unprivileged
as are the documents themselves”). After Austin-Bagley Corp. was decided, several lower
federal courts adopted its reasoning. See, e.g., Pulford v. United States, 155 F.2d 944, 947
(6th Cir. 1946); Lumber Prods. Ass’n v. United States, 144 F.2d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 1944);
Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61, 66-67 (4th Cir. 1944), aff’d, 323 U.S. 18
(1944); United States v. Ill. Alcohol Co., 45 F.2d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1930).
274
354 U.S. 118 (1957).
275
Id. at 119.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
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found Curcio guilty of contempt due solely to his refusal to answer questions
pursuant to the personal subpoena ad testificandum; Curcio was not charged
with failing to produce the union documents ordered by the subpoena duces
tecum.279 After the appellate court affirmed Curcio’s contempt conviction, the
Court addressed whether a custodian of entity documents may invoke the Fifth
when asked to explain the whereabouts of documents which he has not
produced.280
The government contended that Wilson’s waiver theory controlled.281
Because a custodian has an obligation to produce the documents, the government
reasoned, that same obligation requires the custodian to account for documents
which have not been produced.282 Because Curcio, “as custodian, was obliged
to produce the books, regardless of their incriminatory character, he must also,
as custodian, explain their nonproduction even if such explanation would
incriminate him.”283 Otherwise, the power to compel production “would be
largely illusory if the custodian of unprivileged organization records could
escape his responsibility by the simple expedient of passing records from one
person to another without explanation.”284 A unanimous Court disagreed.285
Writing for the Court, and presumably viewing the government’s position as
seeking an exception to the Fifth Amendment, Justice Burton opined that the
“Fifth Amendment suggests no such exception.”286 Justice Burton explained that
a “custodian, by assuming the duties of his office, undertakes the obligation to
produce the books” when subpoenaed.287 However, that custodian cannot
lawfully be compelled, without a grant of immunity, “to condemn himself by his
own oral testimony.”288 As support for this distinction, Justice Burton cited dicta
from Wilson stating that custodians “may decline to utter upon the witness stand
a single self-incriminating word,” and language from White which noted that
White “had not been subpoenaed personally to testify.”289 According to Justice
279
Id. at 119-21 (sentencing Curcio to six months confinement unless he sooner answered
such questions surrounding personal subpoena).
280
See id. at 122. The Court framed the issue as follows: “[W]hether the custodian of a
union’s books and records may, on the ground of his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, refuse to answer questions asked by a federal grand jury as to the whereabouts
of such books and records which he has not produced pursuant to subpoena.” Id. at 118-19.
281
See Brief for the United States at 20-21, Curcio, 354 U.S. 118 (No. 260).
282
Id. at 13.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Curcio, 354 U.S. at 118.
286
Id. at 123.
287
Id. at 123-24.
288
Id. at 124.
289
Id. (first quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911); and then quoting
White v. United States, 322 U.S. 694, 696 (1944)). Justice Burton noted that “oral testimony
by individuals can properly be compelled only by exchange of immunity for waiver of
privilege.” Curcio, 354 U.S. at 124 (quoting Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 27 (1948)).
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Burton, these rulings merely established that a custodian waives his privilege for
the production of documents; none held that a custodian “waives his
constitutional privilege as to oral testimony by assuming the duties of his
office.”290
As for the lower court rulings, like Judge Learned Hand’s decision in AustinBagley Corp., Justice Burton asserted those cases were “distinguishable” and
there was no need for the Court to assess their correctness.291 Requiring a
representative or custodian to identify or authenticate documents for admission
in evidence “merely makes explicit what is implicit in the production itself.”292
In other words, compelled production poses “little, if any, further danger of
incrimination” for the custodian.293 Curcio, by contrast, was asked to do more
than merely identify documents already disclosed. The government sought to
compel him to reveal, by oral testimony, the location of documents which he
had failed to produce, or to name the persons who might have possessed those
documents. Those answers go beyond being merely “auxiliary to the
production” of corporate records.294
After putting aside Judge Learned Hand’s analysis, Justice Burton offered a
final justification for his holding. Shifting his legal analysis, he explained that
the Fifth Amendment was unavailable to a custodian compelled to produce
entity documents “because he does not own the records and has no legally
cognizable interest in them.”295 Compelled oral testimony about the
whereabouts of nonproduced documents is different because it requires the
custodian “to disclose the contents of his own mind,” which might cause the
custodian “to convict himself out of his own mouth.”296
Of course, this explanation permitted the Court to distance itself, at least
partially, from Wilson’s waiver theory and resurrect the other core of Wilson’s
two part holding—the property rights basis of Wilson.297 This shift in reasoning
also excused the Court from offering a principled explanation of why Wilson’s
waiver theory operates only against forced production of documents. After
Curcio, availability of the waiver theory turns on the type of testimony being
compelled—a custodian waives the Fifth regarding compelled production of
records, but not so for compelled oral testimony.298 Left unresolved was how
290

Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 125.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
Id. at 128.
296
Id.
297
See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text (discussing corporate officer’s inability
to retain possession over corporate books which belonged to organization of which he was
employee).
298
The flaw in Wilson’s waiver theory and Curcio’s untenable distinction between types
of testimony protected by the Fifth Amendment was on display for the Justices in McPhaul v.
291
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this reinterpretation of Wilson affected cases like Wheeler which involved
former entity records lawfully owned and possessed by former custodians.299
Wheeler had relied on Wilson’s waiver theory to deny a claim of privilege by
former corporate officers who rightfully possessed documents of a dissolved
corporation.300 The fact that the subpoenaed documents in Wheeler “belonged
to” the defendants was constitutionally irrelevant.301 Without admitting it,
Curcio limited Wilson’s waiver theory by drawing a nontextual and arbitrary
line between different types of incriminating testimony from representatives of
collective entities.302
United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960), but they paid no attention to it. There, McPhaul, an officer
of the Civil Rights Congress, an organization deemed to be subversive by the Attorney
General of the United States, refused to disclose entity documents after being subpoenaed by
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Id. at 373-74. When asked by the
committee chairman whether he would produce the requested records, McPhaul refused to
answer “this or any question which deals with the possession or custody of the books and
records called for in the subpoena. I claim my privilege under the fifth amendment.” Id. at
375. McPhaul was later convicted of contempt, and the Court upheld the conviction. Id. at
373-83. A majority rejected McPhaul’s constitutional claim that answering questions about
the custody or possession of the documents’ location wfould be incriminating, simply citing
the waiver analysis reaffirmed in White. See id. at 380. As one commentator has noted, Curcio
and McPhaul are different sides of the same testimonial coin: “[T]estimony and production
are indistinguishable in the rare case when mere knowledge of the documents’ location is the
incriminating fact, since both require the witness to reveal the same knowledge from within
his own mind.” Fiebach, supra note 54, at 406.
299
See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 478 (1913).
300
See id. at 490.
301
Id.
302
Cf. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 41 n.179 (1986) (“If a witness would not
have to answer questions as to whether he possesses certain documents, whether he knows
the nature of them, whether the documents belong to some specific person, and many similar
questions, there is no reason why he should be compelled to answer such questions implicitly
by producing the documents. Ruling on privilege claims is never easy, since courts must be
concerned lest they compel the very disclosure that they seek to avoid in the process of ruling
on a claim. Bright-line rules are no more justified with respect to documents than with respect
to oral testimony.”).
The arbitrary nature of the distinction created by Curcio does not disappear if one relies on
the state’s visitatorial powers to force testimony from a custodian. In Wilson, Justice Hughes
stressed that the “reserved power of visitation would be seriously embarrassed, if not wholly
defeated in its effective exercise, if guilty officers could refuse inspection of the records and
papers of the corporation.” Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1910). However,
Justice Hughes quickly noted that a corporate officer “may decline to utter upon the witness
stand a single self-criminating word.” Id. at 385. Thus, the visitatorial power “gives the state
the right to drag from [a custodian’s] custody documents but not to compel his lips to open.”
Compelling a Corporate Officer to Produce Official Records in His Custody Which May
Incriminate Him, 73 CENT. L.J. 19, 19 (1911). As noted by one commentator
contemporaneous to the announcement of Wilson, “it is hard to see why refusal for an officer
to produce books might any more seriously embarrass ‘the reserved power of visitation’ than
the officer’s refusal to give oral testimony.” Id. at 20 (quoting Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384).
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Bellis v. United States (1974)

Before the Court announced a groundbreaking ruling in 1976, there was one
additional case in the collective entity saga that had the potential to undo the
collective entity doctrine as it applied to custodians and representatives of
artificial entities. For approximately fourteen years, Isadore Bellis was the senior
partner in Bellis, Kolsby & Wolf, a Philadelphia law firm.303 In 1969, Bellis left
the firm, the partnership dissolved, and Bellis joined a new firm.304 Under
instructions from Bellis or his attorney, Bellis’s secretary removed the
partnership records to Bellis’s new office.305 On May 1, 1973, Bellis was served
with a subpoena ordering him to appear and testify before a federal grand jury
and to bring certain partnership records of Bellis, Kolsby & Wolf, because Bellis
was the target of an income tax investigation.306 Bellis appeared but refused to
produce the records, invoking the Fifth, and the lower courts found him in civil
contempt.307 He then asked the Court to decide whether a partner in a small law
firm may plead the Fifth to justify refusing to produce partnership financial
records. The Court ruled that the privilege was unavailable in these
circumstances.308
Writing for eight members of the Court, Justice Marshall explained that the
Court’s previous precedents were based on the following reasoning: First, the
privilege is a personal right and applies to the “business records of the sole
proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents containing more
intimate information about the individual’s private life.”309 But the individual
“cannot rely upon the privilege to avoid producing the records of a collective
entity which are in his possession in a representative capacity,” even if these
records are personally incriminating.310 Thus, the Fifth Amendment is “limited
to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory
incrimination through his own testimony or personal records.”311
Second, these same precedents finding the privilege inapplicable to the
records of artificial entities parallels the Fifth Amendment’s concern with
individual privacy.312 Momentarily reviving Boyd, Justice Marshall drew a
connection between Boyd and Wilson. Protecting privacy was the main concern
in Boyd, and was the basis for distinguishing the corporate records subject to
valid governmental compulsion in Wilson from the private papers

303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312

Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 86 (1974).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 86, 96-97.
Id. at 86-87.
See id. at 95.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89-90 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
See id. at 90.
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constitutionally protected in Boyd.313 A “substantial claim of privacy or
confidentiality” is typically inapt for the financial records of a collective
entity.314 These records are often regulated by statute and accessible to other
members of the firm. Justice Marshall then identified the relevance of the
visitatorial powers doctrine invoked in Wilson: “[C]orporate records do not
contain the requisite element of privacy or confidentiality essential for the
privilege to attach.”315 The result in White was consistent with this reasoning
because the union records subpoenaed related to “organized, institutional
activity,” and not the personal records of individual union members.316
It was a short step to apply this logic to partnerships, which “may and
frequently do represent organized institutional activity so as to preclude any
claim of Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to the partnership’s financial
records.”317 When confronted by Bellis’s assertion that he had a direct ownership
interest in partnership records which entitled him to invoke the Fifth, a claim
that Wilson could not make regarding corporate records, Justice Marshall
acknowledged the point but countered that previous cases, including White and
Wheeler, had presented similar claims for the invoking privilege.318 Although a
property-based theory for invoking the Fifth had prevailed in Boyd, Justice
Marshall now dismissed the relevance of title or ownership in the subpoenaed
documents with the assertion that “White clearly established that the mere
existence of such an ownership interest is not in itself sufficient to establish a
claim of privilege.”319

313
Id. at 91-92 (citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1910); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Professor Cole rightly describes Marshall’s
description here as close to “disingenuous” since the records at issue in Boyd—invoices for
imported plate glass—“could hardly be characterized as more ‘private’ than the corporate
documents at issue in Wilson—copies of letters and telegrams signed by the president of the
corporation relating to alleged antitrust violations.” Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra
note 20, at 37.
314
Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92.
315
Id.
316
Id. (quoting White, 322 at 701). Professor Rothman describes Bellis’s reliance on
privacy as a shift in rationale and “a new, independent justification” for the results in Wilson
and White. Rothman, supra note 15, at 422-25.
317
Bellis, 417 U.S. at 93.
318
Id. at 88.
319
Id. at 97 n.8. Justice Marshall also dispatched in a footnote Bellis’s argument that Boyd
had already decided the Fifth Amendment issue in his favor. Id. at 95 n.2. Acknowledging
that the court order in Boyd was issued to a partnership, Justice Marshall explained that Boyd
was decided during the infancy of the Court’s Fifth Amendment doctrine and neither the
parties nor the Court had recognized the significance of this fact. Id. Further, the Boyd Court
did not probe the nature of the partnership or “the capacity in which the invoice was acquired
or held.” Id. Tellingly, Justice Marshall concluded with the observation that it was uncertain
“how our decision today would affect the result of Boyd on the facts of that case.” Id. After
reading this passage, students of the Court knew that Boyd was all but dead. See id. at 105
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Bellis, as Justice Alito noted, was the capstone of seven decades of judicial
constriction of the Fifth Amendment.320 Justice Alito also recognized that “these
decisions focused on the contents of the subpoenaed records, not on the act of
production.”321 When a defendant did object that the act of producing records
would incriminate him, the Justices ignored the point, as they did in McPhaul;
in Curcio, the Justices dismissed as trivial the implied admission associated with
the act of production.322
In any event, the distinction Justice Alito highlighted did not matter to the
Court. The contents of subpoenaed documents were inevitably incriminating,
which is why government officials wanted to examine the records. Put simply,
whatever the focus—the contents of the records themselves, or the implicit
incriminating admission in the act of production—“neither were privileged.”323
While Bellis certainly shifted gears slightly by injecting privacy as a factor in
the collective entity cases, like its predecessors from Wilson onward, the result
in Bellis was motivated by the needs of law enforcement, which meant the
privilege could not be tolerated.324
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing Court had effectively overruled Boyd by holding
government can force person to produce private records to promote criminal investigation of
him); Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 37 n.129 (“[T]he Bellis Court was
essentially able to overrule Boyd and reject its Fifth Amendment holding without explicitly
acknowledging that it had done so.”).
There was one final housekeeping matter Justice Marshall resolved. Bellis claimed that the
“test” announced in White for determining the applicability of the Fifth Amendment in cases
like his was whether the entity “has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership
and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal
interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or groups interests only.”
Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100 (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 701). Justice Marshall found that this test
was vague and unhelpful in deciding how to apply the privilege in collective entity contexts.
See id. Justice Marshall was willing to say that the Court’s result might be different if this
case concerned “a small family partnership” or “some other pre-existing relationship of
confidentiality among the partners.” Id. at 101. But the facts in Bellis indicated that Bellis
held the records in a representative capacity, and thus, he could not invoke the Fifth. Id. While
Justice Marshall’s holding is confined to the “circumstances of this case,” id. at 95, Professor
Rothman contends that the logic of Bellis “carried out consistently, would make denial of fifth
amendment protection for the records of any partnership a virtual certainty.” Rothman, supra
note 15, at 423.
320
See Alito, supra note 47, at 68.
321
Id.
322
The only type of testimony the Curcio Court was willing to recognize under the Fifth
Amendment was “oral” testimony. See King, supra note 52, at 1550-51 (“[Curcio] noted that
the act of producing union records involved potentially incriminating admissions, but
reasoned that the fifth amendment protected only a producer’s ‘oral’ testimony, not those
admissions implicit in production.”).
323
Id. at 1549.
324
Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90 (explaining that if custodian of entity records could invoke his
personal privilege, that result would undermine long-standing rule that artificial entities are
not protected by Fifth Amendment and “largely frustrate legitimate governmental regulation
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In 1976, however, the Court’s view of what the Fifth Amendment protects
regarding the production and disclosure of documents changed dramatically.
Fisher v. United States325 issued a jolt to the law of documents and the
privilege.326 Among other things, Fisher embraced a literal and narrow
interpretation of the privilege.327 As a result, privacy was no longer a concern
for the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, under Fisher’s analysis, the contents of
preexisting business records are not protected by the privilege.328 Fisher also
contemplated that some forms of the act of production might be sufficiently
testimonial to trigger Fifth Amendment protection, which meant that Fisher
intuitively resuscitated the privilege for custodians and representatives of
collective entities.329
Twelve years later, United States v. Doe330 demonstrated that the Justices took
seriously what Fisher said about certain acts of production being protected by
the Constitution.331 As a result, Fisher’s act of production doctrine could provide
of such organizations”); see also Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 35 (“The
needs of law enforcement led the Court to stretch the collective entity doctrine further in
[Bellis] . . . .”); Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law, supra note 18, at 57 (arguing the Court
in Bellis “relied heavily, as it had in White, on the policy of aiding effective law
enforcement”); MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY
FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 115 (1986) (stating “only considerable hostility to the privilege”
explains result in Bellis).
325
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
326
Id. at 391 (focusing on act of production of documents rather than contents of
subpoenaed records).
327
Id.
328
After the ruling in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000), scholars have
questioned whether this aspect of Fisher remains good law. See Cole, The Fifth Amendment
and Compelled Production, supra note 44, at 129 (arguing Hubbell was correctly decided and
it “effectively, if not explicitly, overruled Fisher in cases where prosecutors are seeking
private documents from an individual”); Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors, supra note 44, at
519 (acknowledging that though Hubbell “gave no indication that it was overruling any aspect
of Fisher[,] . . . Hubbell should be interpreted as reformulating Fisher”); Uviller, supra note
44, at 335 (criticizing Hubbell for going “well beyond what Fisher requires and com[ing]
dangerously close to allowing the Fifth Amendment . . . to shield the contents of freely written
documents”); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 859 n.65 (2001) (noting Fisher “may have been largely
(albeit tacitly) overruled by [Hubbell]”). It is important to note that a majority of the Court
has not signaled dissatisfaction with the part of Fisher’s holding that allows prosecutors to
subpoena voluntarily created private documents without triggering Fifth Amendment
protection. It is equally vital to understand that Hubbell is a significant ruling and certainly
restrains the subpoena power of prosecutors and grand juries. Whether Hubbell has
substantially altered or overruled Fisher is beyond the scope of this Article.
329
See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 391.
330
465 U.S. 605 (1984).
331
Id. at 605 (holding while contents of business records are not protected by privilege
because they were voluntarily prepared, compelled act of producing those records are
protected because act of production is testimonial).
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meaningful Fifth Amendment protection in contexts where the government was
on a fishing expedition for incriminating records. Together, these cases finally
closed the door on Boyd’s expansive view of the Fifth Amendment.
G.

Fisher v. United States (1976)

In Fisher, taxpayers who were under investigation for possible civil or
criminal violations of the federal income tax laws pled the Fifth when served
with summonses from the Internal Revenue Service to disclose documents
prepared by their accountants.332 In rejecting their claims, Justice White’s
opinion for the Court fundamentally altered Fifth Amendment law. For purposes
of this Article, Fisher transformed the privilege in three important ways. First,
Justice White made plain that personal privacy is not protected by the
privilege.333 Emphasizing the text of the provision, he explained that the Fifth
Amendment has never barred the use of evidence that “did not involve
compelled testimonial self-incrimination of some sort.”334 The Fourth
Amendment addresses “the subject of personal privacy directly,” and the
Framers did not intend the Fifth Amendment to shield the same subject “but to
deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination.”335
Second, Fisher revisited Boyd and found that many of “Boyd’s express or
implicit declarations have not stood the test of time.”336 Justice White granted
that Boyd had been read to establish the rule that the Fifth Amendment “prevents
compelled production of documents over objection that such production might
incriminate” a person.337 But Boyd’s holding originally rested upon Fourth and
Fifth Amendment norms that the modern Court no longer approved. Thus, “the
prohibition against forcing the production of private papers has long been a rule
searching for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth
Amendment against compelling a person to give ‘testimony’ that incriminates
him.”338
Using the specific facts of Fisher as a backdrop, Justice White then devised
Boyd’s death certificate. He explained that a summons or subpoena served on a
taxpayer to disclose an accountant’s workpapers clearly involves “substantial
compulsion” from the government.339 But it would not require oral testimony
from the taxpayer, nor compel the “taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth
of the contents of the documents sought.”340 Thus, though the contents of the
documents might incriminate the taxpayer, there is no violation of the privilege
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340

Fisher, 425 U.S. at 394-95.
See id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 409.
Id.
Id.
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because the Fifth Amendment “protects a person only against being incriminated
by his own compelled testimonial communications.”341 The summonses did not
force the taxpayers to say anything about the accountants’ papers. Moreover,
because the preparation of the documents “was wholly voluntary,” the contents
of the documents was not compelled testimony “either of the taxpayers or of
anyone else.”342 The upshot of this aspect of Fisher was that the Fifth
Amendment was to be read literally and narrowly: it would only protect against
“the compulsory extraction of testimony.”343 Voluntarily prepared papers or
business records were not protected.344
Third, after transcribing Boyd’s death certificate, Justice White took a step
back to note that the “act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena
nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the
contents of the papers produced.”345 In other words, the act of production
provides testimonial evidence because it acknowledges “the existence of the
papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer,” and
authenticates the papers demanded.346
This was a significant move; it was the first time that the Court had signaled
“that the fifth amendment may protect testimony implicit in the act of producing
records even when it does not protect the contents of the records.”347 But after
formulating additional protection under the privilege, Justice White reversed
field again by creating a judge-made exception to the freshly minted protection
341

Id.
Id. at 409-10. Justice White also observed that “[t]he fact that the documents may have
been written by the person asserting the privilege is insufficient to trigger the privilege,” and
“unless the Government has compelled the subpoenaed person to write the document, the fact
that it was written by him is not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue.” Id.
at 410 n.11 (citations omitted).
343
Alito, supra note 47, at 43.
344
Applied in a principled manner, “Fisher’s analysis did not logically allow distinctions
to be drawn between different types of voluntarily created records.” Id. at 44 n.86. Indeed,
Fisher’s rejection of Boyd’s view of the privilege “appeared to apply to all documents, not
just tax records.” Slobogin, supra note 157, at 820. Yet, at the end of his opinion, Justice
White noted that the Court was not deciding whether the Fifth Amendment would shield a
taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession because the papers compelled
in Fisher were not the taxpayers’ “private papers.” Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886)). Reserving this issue conflicts with the entirety
of Fisher’s logic. See Alito, supra note 47, at 44 n.86.
345
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
346
Id.
347
King, supra note 52, at 1549. As noted above, the act of production “theory was not an
innovation conceived by the Fisher Court but had existed for most of the [twentieth] century.”
Alito, supra note 47, at 45. In 1904, Wigmore apparently was the first academic to write about
the theory. Id. Justice Alito also notes that the theory was later endorsed by some prominent
jurists, including then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo when he sat on the Court of Appeals of New
York and Judge Henry Friendly. Id. at 45-46. Ultimately, Justice Alito says: “The
theory . . . was an academic creation and found judicial acceptance more as an excuse than a
reason.” Id. at 46.
342
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he had just crafted. Focusing on the specific facts before the Court, Justice White
found it “doubtful” that the taxpayers’ implied admissions of existence and
possession would constitute “testimony” under the Fifth Amendment.348
Why not? Because the demanded records were prepared by the accountants,
and the government did not need the taxpayers’ “truthtelling” to prove the
existence of, or the taxpayers’ access to, the records.349 “The existence and
location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or
nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he
in fact has the papers.”350 Put differently, the taxpayers’ disclosure of the
documents is not “testimony” but “surrender.”351
Although Justice White may have thought that his analysis in Fisher was a
conventional application of the privilege to the facts,352 legal scholars had a
different reaction to Fisher. For some, Fisher was a “revolutionary opinion” that
“turned fifth amendment jurisprudence upside-down” and had a “cataclysmic”
effect regarding the production of documentary evidence.353 Another scholar
wrote that Fisher had an “extraordinary impact on the law of documentary
subpoenas.”354 A third scholar stated that Fisher “adopted an entirely new form
of analysis for determining the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to
subpoenas for documents.”355 Finally, another scholar called Fisher a
“bombshell” due to its “new conception of the manner in which the Fifth
Amendment applies to documents.”356 The consensus among legal scholars was

348

Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
Id.
350
Id.
351
Id. At this point in his opinion, Justice White references the collective entity cases and
states that the Court has “time and again” upheld subpoenas served on custodians who hold
the documents of artificial entities, “despite the fact that producing the documents tacitly
admits their existence and their location in the hands of their possessor.” Id. at 411-12.
Because the taxpayers’ act of producing the documents provided no more additional
information than the act of disclosing documents in the artificial entity cases did, the
summonses were constitutionally valid. Id. at 412. Of course, Justice White ignores the fact
that the collective entity cases never fully addressed whether a custodian’s act of production
was testimonial under the Fifth Amendment.
352
See, e.g., id. at 401 (“We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the
moorings of its language, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy—a word not
mentioned in its text . . . .”).
353
Rothman, supra note 15, at 387, 425, 428.
354
Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law, supra note 18, at 4-5 (noting Fisher “brushed
aside many of the doctrines that had previously dominated fifth amendment analysis,” and
replaced it with a “new system in which the availability of the privilege turns, apparently
exclusively, upon whether the act of production involves testimonial self-incrimination”).
355
Henning, Testing the Limits, supra note 45, at 419.
356
Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 48. Even Justice Alito described
Fisher as a “more radical approach” than the Court’s most contemporaneous precedent
addressing the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s protection when the government seizes
349
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that, after Fisher, “the contents of all business documents—perhaps writings of
all kinds—are now unprivileged.”357 The only thing the privilege protects
concerning preexisting documents is the “incriminating information
communicated by the act of responding to a subpoena dues tecum or a summons
for documents,”358 and some questioned, as a practical matter, how much
protection would be offered by the new act of production doctrine.359
H.

United States v. Doe (1984)

Twelve years later, the Court applied Fisher in Doe and showed it was
adhering to Fisher’s vision of the privilege.360 The issue in Doe was whether,
and to what extent, the privilege applies when a sole proprietor is served a
subpoena for his business records.361 In one way, Doe was a significant case
because the type of subpoena involved was “issued daily by federal grand juries
across the country.”362 Doe was the owner of several sole proprietorships.363 A
grand jury, investigating political corruption, served five subpoenas on Doe
demanding various types of business records of his companies, including phone
and bank records.364 Two lower courts upheld Doe’s claim of privilege in
response to the subpoenas because producing the records would incriminate Doe
under Fisher’s act of production rule.365 The government appealed to the Court.
Doe announced two principal rulings: First, the contents of the business
records were not protected by the privilege because they were not compelled by
the government.366 Second, the Court ruled that the act of producing the records

incriminating documents. Alito, supra note 47, at 43 (discussing Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463 (1976)).
357
Rothman, supra note 15, at 388; see also Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note
20, at 48 (describing Fisher as holding “that the contents of voluntarily created preexisting
documents are not subject to the Self-Incrimination Clause, no matter how incriminating the
contents may be to their creator, because their creation was not ‘compelled’ within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment”).
358
Rothman, supra note 15, at 388.
359
See Cole, Limited Liability Enterprises, supra note 20, at 48-49 (notwithstanding
Fisher’s acceptance of act of production theory, “its practical effect was to make the SelfIncrimination Clause inapplicable to most document productions”); Henning, Testing the
Limits, supra note 45, at 421 (discussing practical restrictions on utilizing act of production
theory); Alito, supra note 47, at 95. Professor Heidt was critical of this aspect of Fisher. He
argued that “Fisher forces upon the lower courts a standard pettifogging in principle and
unworkable in practice.” Heidt, supra note 43, at 443.
360
465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984). For what it is worth, Justice Alito argued Doe on behalf of
the government while working for the Solicitor General’s Office.
361
Id. at 606.
362
Alito, supra note 47, at 51.
363
Doe, 465 U.S. at 606.
364
Id.
365
Id. at 607-09.
366
Id. at 611-12.
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was protected because it was testimonial.367 The second part of the holding could
be read as being based on deference to the conclusions of the courts below,
which found Doe’s production of the documents would be testimonial because
disclosure to the grand jury would admit their existence and authenticity.368
After Fisher, the first holding in Doe was expected. Fisher established that
the contents of voluntarily created business documents are not protected by the
Fifth Amendment; the privilege only protects against compelled selfincrimination.369 “Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no
compulsion is present.”370 Because Doe did not argue that he prepared the
documents involuntarily, or that the subpoena would “force him to restate,
repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents,” the privilege did not apply to the
subpoenaed documents.371 Doe’s possession of the documents was irrelevant to
the issue of whether the creation of the documents was compelled. Thus, “the
contents of [the] records are not privileged.”372
Regarding its second holding, Doe ruled that the act of producing the business
records was protected by the privilege because it “involve[d] testimonial selfincrimination.”373 A government subpoena compels the holder of documents to
perform an act that may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect.
Relying on Fisher, the Court explained that compliance with a subpoena
concedes the existence of the documents demanded and their possession or
control of the target.374 Compliance also indicates that the holder believes that
the papers are those described in the subpoena.375 Fisher ruled that whether the
act of production is testimonial often depends on the facts and circumstances of
particular cases.376 Here, the Court deferred to the factual findings of the courts
below, although in a footnote it stated that the findings and allegations below
“were sufficient to establish a valid claim of the privilege against self367

Id.
Id. at 607-10.
369
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
370
Doe, 465 U.S. at 610. At this point, Justice Powell dropped a footnote wherein he
responded to Doe’s claim that the Fifth Amendment protects a zone of privacy, recognized in
Boyd. Id. at 610 n.8. Justice Powell noted that earlier cases, including Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399,
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976), and United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,
233 n.7 (1975), had rejected this aspect of Boyd. Id.
371
Id. at 612.
372
Id. At the end of this passage, Justice Powell approvingly cited an appellate ruling,
which noted that the “line of cases culminating in Fisher have stripped the content of business
records of any Fifth Amendment protection.” Id. at 612 n.10 (quoting In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980)). In that same footnote, Justice Powell
stated, “If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the
document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not privileged.” Id.
Of course, this logic also applies to a personal diary.
373
Id. at 613.
374
Id.
375
Id.
376
Id.
368
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incrimination,” suggesting that the Court independently found a constitutional
violation.377
Lastly, the Court turned aside the government’s request that it adopt a doctrine
of constructive use immunity. Conceding that it could have compelled Doe to
disclose the documents by granting statutory use immunity, the government
urged the Court to adopt a judicial doctrine of constructive use immunity, where
the judiciary would bar the government from using “the incriminatory aspects
of the act of production against the person claiming the privilege even though
statutory procedures have not been followed.”378 The Court repeated its view
that immunity is a tool for Congress and the Executive Branch.379
Justice O’Connor wrote separately “to make explicit what is implicit in the
analysis [of the majority opinion]: that the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely
no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind.”380 She also stated
that Fisher had “sounded the death knell” for Boyd’s understanding that the Fifth
Amendment protects the privacy of papers.381 Justice Marshall disputed Justice
O’Connor’s view that the majority’s reasoning provided no Fifth Amendment
protection “for the contents of private papers of any kind.”382 Justice Marshall
countered that the records demanded in Doe were “business records which
implicate a lesser degree of concern for privacy interests than, for example,
personal diaries.”383
I.

Braswell v. United States (1988)

Not surprisingly in light of their innovative approach to the privilege, Fisher
and Doe raised many questions about the future of Fifth Amendment law. The
most important was whether the act of production doctrine, reaffirmed and
applied to quash subpoenas in Doe, would apply to representatives of collective
377

Id. at 614 n.13.
Id. at 616.
379
Id. (“Congress gave certain officials in the Department of Justice exclusive authority to
grant immunities.” (quoting Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1983) (footnote
omitted))).
380
Id. at 618 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
381
Id.
382
Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
383
Id. (footnote omitted). One final thought about Doe is worth noting: the Fourth Circuit
read Doe as leaving open whether a subpoena for voluntarily prepared individual business
and financial records of a suspected drug dealer were protected under the Fifth Amendment.
United States v. (Under Seal), 745 F.2d 834, 839 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Doe No. 462, 471 U.S. 1001 (1985), and vacated as moot, 105 S. Ct. 1861
(1985). The Fourth Circuit ruled that Doe’s first holding applied only to the business records
of a sole proprietor and not to the records of an individual. The latter, according to the Fourth
Circuit, remained protected by Boyd. See United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1238 (4th
Cir. 1986), abrogated by Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988). Justice Alito contends
that this distinction is “essentially meaningless” because the term “sole proprietorship” is
“nothing more than the name given to a business owned by an individual rather than a
collective entity.” Alito, supra note 47, at 54.
378
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entities and allow them to take the Fifth when subpoenaed for entity documents
that are personally incriminating. For almost a century, the collective entity
cases established that custodians and representatives had no Fifth Amendment
protection when served with government subpoenas looking for entity
documents that could send them to prison.384
By contrast, Doe showed that the act of production theory could provide
meaningful protection against a government fishing expedition for incriminating
business documents. There was no way to reconcile the act of production rule,
which was now part of Fifth Amendment law and thus “the supreme Law of the
Land,”385 and the collective entity rule. As Professor Rothman quipped, after “a
sea change in fifth amendment jurisprudence,” the judiciary could “no longer
conduct ‘business as usual’ when determining the scope of fifth amendment
protection for business documents.”386 The Court granted review in Braswell v.
United States387 to decide whether the custodian of corporate records may resist
a subpoena for such records on the ground that the act of production would
incriminate him.388 The Court held the custodian had no privilege.389
Randy Braswell owned and operated two Mississippi corporations,
Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc., and Worldwide Purchasing, Inc.390 Braswell
was the sole shareholder.391 As required by Mississippi law, both companies had
three directors, Braswell, his wife, and his mother, though the latter two
individuals had no “authority over the business affairs of either corporation.”392
A federal grand jury issued a subpoena to Braswell in his capacity as president
of the companies, demanding he produce the books and records of his
companies.393 The subpoena did not require that Braswell testify, but he moved
384

See Rothman, supra note 15, at 387.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
386
Rothman, supra note 15, at 387. Many others saw the problem as well. See Alito, supra
note 47, at 65 (noting collective entity rule which bars custodians of entity records from
invoking privilege to resist subpoenas has “been called into question by Fisher and Doe”);
Foster, supra note 54, at 1607 (arguing that “jurisprudential underpinnings of the
representative capacity doctrine have been impliedly rejected by Fisher and other recent Court
decisions”); King, supra note 52, at 1544-45 (describing split in lower courts as to whether
Fisher and Doe altered collective entity doctrine); Organizational Papers, supra note 52, at
640-41.
387
487 U.S. 99 (1988).
388
Id. at 100.
389
Id. at 117-18.
390
Id. at 100-01.
391
Id. at 101.
392
Id. at 101.
393
Significantly, the subpoena was not directed to Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc., or
Worldwide Purchasing, Inc. During oral argument, the government explained why the
subpoena was served on a specific individual rather than the corporation itself:
[Justice John Paul Stevens]: In other words, what you’re saying is you want to be able to
ask the individual whether he has in fact disclosed everything he knows about the
385
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to quash the subpoena because producing the records would incriminate him.394
The district court denied the motion, ruling that the collective entity doctrine
barred Braswell from taking the Fifth.395 The court rejected Braswell’s argument
that “the collective entity doctrine does not apply when a corporation is so small
that it constitutes nothing more than the individual’s alter ego.”396 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed, citing Bellis for the rule that a custodian may not claim the
privilege “no matter how small the corporation may be.”397 The Fifth Circuit
noted that Bellis remained controlling following Doe, and therefore, “Braswell,
as custodian of corporate documents, has no act of production privilege under
the fifth amendment regarding corporate documents.”398
At the Court, Braswell argued, relying upon Fisher and Doe, that disclosure
of the records had independent testimonial significance, which would have
incriminated him individually, and that the Fifth Amendment barred government
compulsion of that act.399 Braswell’s assertion of the privilege was not based on
the claim that the contents of the business records would incriminate him but
instead upon the premise that the act of production would do so.400 Significantly,
the government was willing to assume that compliance with the subpoena would
require acts of testimonial self-incrimination from Braswell.401 None of the
Court’s prior collective entity cases squarely presented the claim that the
custodian would be incriminated by the act of production, in contrast to the
contents of the documents. That fact made Braswell different from all of the
prior collective entity cases. None of this mattered, however. A five-Justice
majority, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held the collective entity rule meant
that Braswell had no privilege.402 In a “spirited dissent, joined by an unusual

corporate documents? That’s asking an individual rather than an officer of the
corporation when you put it that way.
[Roy T. Englert, Jr.]: . . . . We want the right to issue the subpoena to the individual. We
want the right to make that individual comply with the subpoena.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Braswell, 487 U.S. 99 (No. 87-3).
394
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 101.
395
Id. at 101-02.
396
Id. at 102.
397
Id.
398
Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1987)).
399
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 393, at 12.
400
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 102-03.
401
During oral argument, Justice Kennedy asked counsel for the government whether the
government was submitting the case “on the assumption that Braswell might well incriminate
himself by reference to the knowledge or the existence of the documents.” Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 393, at 26. Counsel for the government stated: “We’re willing to submit
the case to this Court on that assumption.” Id.; see also id. at 36 (counsel for the government
stating that “we’re submitting this case on the assumption—not the concession—but the
assumption, that there could be a testimonial incident to this act of production, as the Court
held there was in Doe”).
402
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 100, 113.
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coalition of his colleagues,”403 Justice Kennedy challenged the foundation of the
majority’s reasoning and captured the fundamental flaw with the collective
entity rule: namely, an individual is denied “his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in order to vindicate the rule that a collective entity
which employs him has no such privilege itself.”404
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that had Braswell “conducted his business
as a sole proprietorship, [Doe] would require that he be provided the opportunity
to show that his act of production would entail testimonial self-incrimination.”405
But Braswell operated his businesses as corporations, and under the Court’s
Fifth Amendment cases, “corporations and other collective entities are treated
differently from individuals.”406 Moreover, the “plain mandate” of the collective
entity decisions “is that without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to
the corporation,” or as in Braswell’s situation, “to the individual in his capacity
as a custodian,” a corporate custodian like Braswell has no privilege.407
Braswell told the Court that the collective entity rule was a response to Boyd,
which protected private papers.408 Braswell argued that the collective entity
cases “were concerned with the contents of the documents subpoenaed,
however, and not with the act of production.”409 He reminded the Court that
Fisher and Doe departed from the privacy-or-not focus of the collective entity
rule, “replacing it with a compelled-testimony standard under which the contents
of business documents are never privileged but the act of producing the
documents may be.”410 Under this view, “the act of production privilege is
available without regard to the entity whose records are being sought.”411
The Chief Justice conceded that Fisher and Doe “embarked upon a new
course of Fifth Amendment analysis,” but that change in direction did not render
the collective entity rule “obsolete.”412 Why not? The Chief Justice explained
that the “agency rationale” supporting the collective entity cases “survives.”413
The custodian of corporate or entity records holds those documents in a
representative, rather than a personal, capacity. The custodian has “certain
obligations,” including the duty to disclose entity documents when demanded
403

Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 173. Justice Kennedy’s dissent was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia. Along with the close split among the Justices, Professor Cole
notes the “difficult nature of the issues presented” in Braswell is “evidenced by the fact that
the Justices did not divide along the usual ideological lines.” Cole, Limited Liability Entities,
supra note 20, at 42 n.150.
404
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
405
Id. at 104 (majority opinion).
406
Id.
407
Id. at 108-09.
408
Id. at 109 (discussing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
409
Id.
410
Id.
411
Id.
412
Id.
413
Id.
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by the government.414 Under the “agency rationale,” when Braswell discloses
incriminating documents indicating that they were in his possession or under his
control, it is not Randy Braswell providing the incriminating testimony but
instead the corporation providing the incriminating testimony. And “[a]ny claim
of Fifth Amendment privilege asserted by the agent would be tantamount to a
claim of privilege by the corporation—which of course possesses no such
privilege.”415 In other words, “Braswell, when producing the documents, is a
stand-in for the corporation; the corporation has no privilege against itself;
therefore, Braswell, when producing the documents, has no privilege against
incriminating himself.”416
Braswell’s agency rationale was the latest in a long line of shifting
justifications proffered by the Court to deny custodians Fifth Amendment
protection. “The traditional agency theory underlying the collective entity
doctrine was one of waiver.”417 Although not disavowing the “waiver”
rationale,418 Braswell added “a new wrinkle to this agency rationale through the
attributed act theory.”419 But the agency rationale, like the waiver rationale, is
pure legal fiction.
The Chief Justice did acknowledge that prior cases, such as Wilson, Dreier v.
United States,420 and Bellis, “did not focus on the testimonial aspect of the act
of production,” but he found, without explaining why, that even if they had, the
results would have been the same.421 Further, the Chief Justice insisted that
414

Id. at 110.
Id. at 110. The “agency rationale” came from the Solicitor General’s brief in Braswell.
The government argued that under the collective entity cases
the individual who produces corporate documents on behalf of the corporation does not
do so in his individual capacity, but rather as the agent of the corporation, so that the act
of production, if incriminatory, constitutes incrimination of the individual by the
corporation, rather than incrimination of the individual by his own words or
deeds. . . . Therefore, when an individual acts as the agent of the corporation—as he does
whenever he produces corporate documents—it is the corporation and not the individual
who is turning over the documents, and there is no privilege available for either the
individual or the corporation to claim.
Brief for the United States at 21-22, Braswell, 487 U.S. 99 (No. 87-3).
416
Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 176.
417
Lathrop, supra note 47, at 573 (explaining that under Wilson a person, “by voluntarily
assuming the duties of custodian, assumes a duty to fulfill all of the obligations of the artificial
entity, thereby waiving his personal privilege to refuse production of incriminating
documents”).
418
See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 113 (explaining “a custodian waives the right to exercise the
privilege”).
419
Lathrop, supra note 47, at 573.
420
221 U.S. 394 (1911).
421
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 111. The misleading nature of this statement is obvious to anyone
well-versed in the collective entity rulings. As Justice Kennedy’s dissent noted, none of the
Court’s prior cases addressed the claim that the custodian would be incriminated by the act of
415
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Fisher reaffirms “the obligation of a corporate custodian to comply with a
subpoena addressed to him.”422 This, of course, is revisionist history. Yes, Fisher
referenced the collective entity cases, but did so in the context of its discussion
of whether the taxpayers’ production of their accountants’ workpapers
constituted testimony vel non.423 Unlike Fisher, however, Braswell was decided
“on the assumption that the act of producing the subpoenaed documents [would]
effect personal incrimination of Randy Braswell, the individual to whom the
subpoena is directed.”424 In Fisher, the government certainly did not concede
that the act of disclosure by the taxpayers would incriminate them. And, of
course, neither Fisher nor Doe involved a custodian of an entity invoking the
privilege. Thus, Fisher could not have addressed, let alone reaffirmed, a legal
principle that was never before it.
The Chief Justice also stated that Curcio not only did not help Braswell’s
position, it “substantiate[d] the Government’s position.”425 Curcio held that a
custodian cannot be forced to provide oral testimony about the location of entity
documents.426 Braswell contended that because Fisher and Doe established that
an act of production can provide incriminating testimony, that act cannot be
compelled either.427 The Chief Justice distinguished Curcio with the ipse dixit
that it involved oral testimony.428
Yes, Curcio ruled that oral testimony could not be compelled, but the Fifth
Amendment bans all compelled incriminating testimony—including
incriminating testimony generated by compelled disclosure of documents. Put
differently, the Chief Justice did not (and could not) explain why a custodian can
be forced to produce documents that constitute incriminating testimony but
cannot be forced to provide oral testimony. The only basis for this distinction is
a judge-made edict, which lacks any nexus to the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the
actual basis for the result in Braswell came when the Chief Justice stated that
recognizing Braswell’s privilege claim “would have a detrimental impact on the

production, in contrast to the contents of the documents. Id. at 123 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
That made Braswell different from all of the prior collective entity cases. The Chief Justice
offered no basis for why this sharp distinction would have been deemed irrelevant by all the
Justices who heard Wilson, Dreier, Wheeler, White, and Bellis. The distinction was not
irrelevant to Professor Wigmore, who noted that “where the corporate misconduct involves
also the claimant’s misconduct, or where the document is in reality the personal act of the
claimant, though nominally that of the corporation, its disclosures are virtually his own, and
to that extent his privilege protects him producing them.” WIGMORE, supra note 49, at § 2259.
422
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 112.
423
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411-12 (1976).
424
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 120 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
425
Id. at 113 (majority opinion).
426
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
427
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 114.
428
Id.
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Government’s efforts to prosecute ‘white-collar crime,’ one of the most serious
problems confronting law enforcement authorities.”429
Braswell countered that the Court’s concerns about effective law enforcement
could be alleviated by granting a corporate custodian like himself statutory
immunity regarding the act of production, or alternatively, requiring that grand
juries address subpoenas “to the corporation and allow[] it to [select] an agent
to produce the records who can do so without incriminating himself.”430 The
Court was not interested in either alternative because it would make prosecution
more arduous for the government.431
First, granting a custodian statutory immunity has “significant drawback[s],”
the biggest being that if the government wants to prosecute the custodian,
onerous burdens would be imposed on the government to prove that all of its
evidence submitted at trial was derived from independent sources.432 That
obstacle might “result in the preclusion of crucial evidence that was obtained
legitimately.”433 And Braswell’s second proposal, according to the Court, was
unworkable. Especially in fact patterns like Braswell’s where the corporate
custodian is the only one who knows the location of the demanded documents,
if the targeted custodian cannot be compelled to assist the appointed custodian
in any way, Braswell’s proposal would mean that “the appointed custodian will
essentially be sent on an unguided search.”434
After rejecting Braswell’s efforts to resist the subpoena because disclosure of
the documents provided incriminating testimony, the Chief Justice curiously
noted “certain consequences flow”435 from the fact that Braswell had waived his
privilege. First, the government must “make no evidentiary use of the ‘individual
act’ against the individual.”436 This means that if the custodian is prosecuted, the
government may not admit into evidence “the fact that the subpoena was served
upon and the corporation’s documents were delivered by one particular
individual, the custodian.”437 In other words, while the government could force
429

Id. at 115.
Id. at 116.
431
See id.
432
See id. at 117.
433
Id.
434
Id. Two commentators with experience on the prosecution and criminal defense side of
the courtroom have noted that the Chief Justice’s concerns regarding immunity for a custodian
hide the real basis for the result in Braswell. See Pickholz & Murphy, supra note 54, at 372
(“[A] grant of use immunity for the act of production would not significantly impede most
investigations. The narrow scope of immunity would cover only the act itself, and the
government would retain access to the records that it sought, have free use of the contents
against everyone, and could use any testimonial act implicit in production against all but the
immunized custodian.”). The actual basis for Braswell was promoting effective law
enforcement.
435
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117.
436
Id. at 118.
437
Id.
430
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Randy Braswell to produce certain documents, the prosecutor could not tell the
jury that Randy Braswell produced the documents. The government, however,
could “use the corporation’s act of production against the custodian.”438
Accordingly, because the jury could not be told that the custodian-defendant
disclosed the documents, “any nexus between the defendant and the documents
results solely from the corporation’s act of production and other evidence in the
case.”439
This is legal gobbledygook. Under Braswell’s agency theory, any
incrimination supposedly comes not from Randy Braswell but rather from the
corporation. That, of course, is nonsense. When Braswell produces the records,
“the act of production is inescapably his own.”440 Any juror paying attention to
the evidence submitted at trial will know this. When a prosecutor admits the
entity’s production of documents at trial, that information “can lead to an
inference [by the jury] that the defendant’s position in the collective entity is
such that he must have been involved in responding to the subpoena, and
therefore has knowledge of the content or existence of the documents.”441 That
inference undeniably implicates the Fifth Amendment. “Although the nexus
between the evidence and the custodian is left for the jury to determine, if the
jury infers such a nexus, the custodian has been compelled to provide
testimonial, incriminating evidence that could help convict him.”442 And it is
Randy Braswell, not the corporation, who will go to prison.443
438

Id.
Id. Although the Chief Justice denied that this judge-made evidentiary use restriction
was precluded by United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614-17 (1984), which expressly rejected
the government’s invitation to have courts grant constructive use immunity in the absence of
a formal request that the federal immunity statue requires, “it is difficult to distinguish the two
approaches.” Massing, supra note 48, at 1190. Indeed, the Chief Justice’s distinction “is
semantic,” and the result is that Braswell “conferred constructive use immunity, in reality if
not in name, and the use of such immunity was expressly prohibited in Doe.” Grogan, supra
note 54, at 732.
440
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
441
Henning, Finding What Was Lost, supra note 112, at 60. Professor Henning also
remarked that the Justices in the Braswell majority understood that this “evidentiary limitation
would not prevent the prosecution from introducing an organization’s production in the hope
that it would incriminate the custodian, only that it must do so indirectly.” Id. (citing Braswell,
487 U.S. at 118).
442
Price, supra note 54, at 394. In Randy Braswell’s case, “the inference of the nexus
between the act of production and Braswell’s participation is not difficult for the jury to
make.” Id. at 394 n.285. While Braswell’s wife and mother were officers of the company,
“they had little or no actual authority.” Id. Braswell was solely responsible for running the
business. “The implication that Braswell possessed the books and was responsible for their
production is clear. Indeed, the smaller the size of the entity, the easier it is for the government
to link the custodian to the act of production.” Id.
443
One commentator notes that Braswell’s agency theory
created a dualistic record custodian: while the government viewed Braswell as an
individual, the Court effectively viewed Braswell as a corporate entity, and accordingly
439
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The Chief Justice never explains why this sleight of hand is necessary if
Braswell has no privilege. Interestingly, the government conceded that it could
not inform the jury that Randy Braswell disclosed the documents and, when
pressed by the Chief Justice during oral argument to identify which case required
that concession, counsel for the government told the Court that no case required
the concession or the requirement eventually imposed by the Court.444
This “shell game” is necessary because the government’s constitutional claim
rested solely on a legal fiction. If the prosecutor could not inform the jury that
Randy Braswell produced the documents, it is because the Fifth Amendment
protected him notwithstanding the fact that he operated his businesses as
corporate entities. But, of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s evidentiary rule
could not rest upon the privilege because “[i]t would be illogical to rely on the
Fifth Amendment privilege as the basis for protecting the person who must
comply with a subpoena when the justification for compelling production is that
the privilege does not apply.”445 As the dissent noted, once this is admitted, the
legal fiction providing the sole support for the majority’s result dissolves.446
Part III demonstrates that the collective entity rule, from its origins in Wilson
to its most recent application in Braswell, has always been in conflict with a
traditional understanding of the Fifth Amendment. The Court has stood by the
rule, however, because allowing representatives of collective entities to invoke
the Fifth would undermine law enforcement interests. This reason, of course,
does not justify the rule. Repeal of the collective entity rule is long overdue.
III. THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY RULE CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH
ESTABLISHED FIFTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
A.

The Text of the Fifth Amendment Is Unambiguous: It Protects All Persons

When studying law—and the Constitution is the “supreme Law of the Land”
in the United States447—law students are taught to start with the text of the
denied his claimed personal privilege; in doing so, however, the Court allowed the
government to prosecute Braswell as an individual despite the Court’s insistence that he
was not an individual possessing a personal fifth amendment right.
Grogan, supra note 54, at 726.
444
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 393, at 27-31. Even a supporter of the
result in Braswell acknowledged that the Court “failed to explain either the constitutional
basis for the evidentiary prohibition [on the government] or what use the government could
make of the act of production.” Henning, Testing the Limits, supra note 45, at 424. In a later
Article, Professor Henning noted that “[t]he origin of this narrow evidentiary protection is
obscure.” Henning, Finding What Was Lost, supra note 112, at 61.
445
Henning, supra note 112, at 61; see also Price, supra note 54, at 394 (“Logically, the
Court cannot invoke the fifth amendment to limit the government’s use of the information.
To do so would be to admit that a custodian’s act of production implicates the fifth
amendment.”).
446
See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 128-29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
447
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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relevant statute or constitutional provision. The issue here is whether the
representative of a collective entity may resist a subpoena for entity records
when producing those records would personally incriminate him. Therefore, a
lawyer’s focus starts and ends with the term “person” in the Fifth Amendment,
which mandates that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.”448 This is the sole focus because all of the other
necessary elements to invoking the Fifth have been satisfied. The subpoena
constitutes government compulsion and the act of producing the records
provides incriminating testimony. If the text is determinative, then an officer of
a corporation or a union official, who is subpoenaed to disclose records of the
artificial entity that personally incriminate him, is entitled to the amendment’s
protection. One does not need to attend three years of law school to know that
the representative of a collective entity is a “person” within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.
For some unexplained reason, the Court has never directly confronted this
straightforward proposition, though Justice McKenna’s dissent in Wilson
forcefully made the point that under the Fifth Amendment, “[t]he accused person
cannot be made the source” of incriminating testimony as a result of government
compulsion.449 In cases like Wilson, White, and Bellis, the incriminating
testimony was found in the contents of the documents that the custodian was
compelled to disclose. After Fisher and Doe altered Fifth Amendment law to
deny protection to the contents of written records voluntarily created, a custodian
cannot take the Fifth due to the incriminatory nature of the contents of records
he was compelled to produce.
Today, when a subpoena compels a custodian to produce records, the
incriminatory testimony is generated by the custodian’s compelled production
of documents. The act of disclosure provides testimony because it communicates
information from the custodian’s mind. The custodian who discloses documents
is conveying the fact that the records exist, that they are the ones demanded by
the subpoena, and that he had control or possession of the records. “Those
assertions can convey information about that individual’s knowledge and state
of mind as effectively as spoken statements, and the Fifth Amendment protects
individuals from having such assertions compelled by their own acts.”450 Put
differently, producing the records “is the functional equivalent of placing the
[custodian] on a witness stand to testify that the records exist, that they are in
her possession, and that they are those requested by the subpoena.”451

448
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). This Article takes no position on whether
corporations or other artificial entities should be protected under the Fifth Amendment. That
question, although never directly addressed by the Court, has been settled since Hale and been
resolved against extending the privilege to collective entities. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 70 (1906).
449
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 393 (1911) (McKenna, J., dissenting).
450
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 122 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
451
Foster, supra note 54, at 1640 (footnotes omitted).
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All of this is now black letter Fifth Amendment law, yet a majority of the
Court in Braswell ruled that a natural person—a real human being, Randy
Braswell—had no Fifth Amendment protection when compelled to perform an
act that was personally incriminating. Some current Justices claim that the text
of the Constitution is determinative when deciding cases.452 Well, the plain
meaning of the text is that all persons are protected. Thus, “[t]he text of the SelfIncrimination Clause simply cannot support”453 the collective entity rule.
Christopher Columbus Wilson, Jasper White, Randy Braswell, and others
similarly situated are undoubtedly “person[s]” within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment and should have been permitted to invoke the Fifth, just as Webster
Hubbell did, when compelled to provide incriminatory testimony.
B.

History: The Collective Entity Rule Is Inconsistent with the Common Law
Privilege

The common law privilege was instrumental to the creation and development
of the Fifth Amendment privilege. James Madison’s original proposal for the
Fifth Amendment “revealed an intent to incorporate into the Constitution the
whole scope of the common-law right.”454 In 1807, when Chief Justice John
Marshall presided over Aaron Burr’s treason prosecution and a question arose
regarding the right of a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment, all of the
lawyers involved “understood the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination as the common law privilege against self-incrimination.”455 Later
in the nineteenth century, when discussing the protection afforded by the Fifth
Amendment, Brown noted the importance of the common law and stated,
referring to the Bill of Rights generally, that “the construction given to those
principles by the English courts is cogent evidence of what they were designed
to secure and of the limitations that should be put upon them.”456 By 1930,
Professor Corwin would state that judicial application of the Fifth Amendment
has rested “upon the English common law as this stood at the time of the
establishment of our government.”457
452
For example, Chavez v. Martinez and Salinas v. Texas both turned on a strict (and
literal) reading of the Fifth Amendment. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67
(2003); Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 181 (2013).
453
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767.
454
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION 423 (1968). As John Langbein states, “the true origins of the common law
privilege are to be found not in the high politics of the English revolutions but in the rise of
adversary criminal procedure at the end of the eighteenth century. The privilege against selfincrimination at common law was the work of defense counsel.” John H. Langbein, The
Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 1047, 1047 (1994).
455
Kerr, supra note 23, at 925.
456
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896).
457
Corwin I, supra note 62, at 3. Professor McNaughton has explained that until the start
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Because “[t]he history of the privilege against self-incrimination is so rich and
dramatic,” and “the risk of overvaluing the available historical evidence is
significant,”458 in some contexts, judges should be cautious when drawing
conclusions from the vast history of the privilege.459 Here, however, the deep
history of the privilege should not deter the Justices. There is no debate that the
privilege, as originally conceived, protected against the compulsory production
of documents. “It is indisputable—indeed, all commentators to address the
question concur—that common law, at the time of the founding, specifically
forbade the compelled production of self-incriminatory documents.”460 As
Justice Thomas has noted, “[t]he 18th-century common-law privilege against
self-incrimination protected against the compelled production of incriminating
physical evidence such as papers and documents.”461 Put differently, “not only
was an accused protected from all judicial questioning under the common law
as this country inherited it, his papers which might contain incriminating matter
were immune from judicial process.”462
And the common law privilege also protected corporate officers and
employees from compelled disclosure of corporate records. As Justice Alito has
written, the “English precedents at the time of the adoption of the fifth
amendment extended the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination

of the 1900s, Fifth Amendment issues rarely arose in litigation because criminal defendants
were disqualified from testifying in most states, and “broader protection—of witnesses, and
in civil cases—was given during the first years of this nation solely on the basis of wellestablished common law, without reference to constitutions.” McNaughton, supra note 55, at
139; see also John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American SelfIncrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 829 (1999) (arguing that “for almost
three quarters of a century after the enactment of constitutional self-incrimination provisions
in the United States, the law of self-incrimination was common-law doctrine rather than
constitutional law”).
458
BERGER, supra note 91, at 1.
459
See Witt, supra note 457, at 831 (“Crossing the bridge between historical analysis and
doctrinal reasoning can be a risky venture; changes in institutions, practices, and surrounding
legal rules make most moves from historical narrative to contemporary legal interpretation
exceedingly complicated. Thus, the history of a doctrine can rarely, if ever, be relied on to
lead to determinate conclusions about contemporary legal questions.”).
460
Nagareda, supra note 82, at 1580. Professor Nagareda also notes that
the crucial historical observation—one not seriously disputed by the Supreme Court, legal
commentators, or historians on the subject—is that the common law at the time of the Bill
of Rights specifically recognized a privilege against self-incrimination by way of
documents. . . . At the very least, this observation reinforces the view that those who
ratified the Fifth Amendment would not have been surprised in the least by the proposition
that self-incriminatory documents come within the category of evidence that a person may
not be compelled to give.
Id. at 1619 (footnote omitted).
461
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 51 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
462
Corwin I, supra note 62, at 11.
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to corporate as well as individual records.”463 Further, though the common law
precedents on whether a corporation could invoke the privilege were
conflicting,464 there was consensus on the right of a corporate officer or
employee to invoke the privilege: “Virtually every precedent said the same
thing: Witnesses required to produce corporate books and records that were selfincriminating could refuse to comply. This principle was established in England
by the middle of the eighteenth century.”465 Finally, the esteemed Wigmore
recognized custodians and representatives were protected by the privilege when
called to produce corporate documents.466
What this all means is that if Christopher Columbus Wilson’s or Randy
Braswell’s Fifth Amendment claims had been raised prior to Hale, there is good
reason to believe that a court, looking to the common law as it existed prior to
1906 or 1911, would have upheld their claims.467 The Justices were aware of
this history and law, but they dismissed it because the duty of a custodian is “to
be determined by our laws.”468 This is classic question-begging. Of course, the
scope of the Fifth Amendment must be determined and measured by American
legal principles. Wilson urged the Court to interpret the Fifth Amendment in the
same manner that both American and British courts had read the privilege when
they upheld claims of corporate employees resisting legal orders for
incriminating records. The Wilson majority brushed aside the common law (and
463
Alito, supra note 47, at 65. After recognizing that the common law privilege applied to
documents, Justice Alito contends that “it does not necessarily follow that the fifth
amendment was meant to freeze every aspect of the common law privilege as it existed at the
time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 79. Relying on Professor Levy’s conclusion
that the Framers “left too few clues” on whether the amendment was “intended . . . to be fully
co-extensive with the common law,” LEVY, supra note 454, at 429-30, Justice Alito ultimately
argues that “[t]he lack of proof” on whether the Fifth was intended to apply to subpoenas for
existing documents “should end the [constitutional] inquiry” and the issue should be left to a
legislative solution. Alito, supra note 47, at 80.
464
See Rothman, supra note 15, at 403.
465
Id. at 405.
466
WIGMORE, supra note 49, at § 2259.
467
Hale did not control Wilson’s Fifth Amendment claim. “What privilege an officer of
the corporation had from producing the books on the ground that they might criminate him
was not necessary to decide [in Hale], as immunity from prosecution was given by statute for
any matter as to which [Hale] should testify.” Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 390
(1911) (McKenna, J., dissenting). As Professor Rothman has noted, the trial court in Hale
found that Hale’s “fifth amendment claim would have been ‘clearly sound’ in the absence of
an immunity statute.” Rothman, supra note 15, at 407 (quoting In re Hale, 139 F. 496, 501
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905), aff’d sub nom. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
William Stuntz has argued that “a turn-of-the-century observer might well have thought
that Boyd and Counselman would apply to corporations, that the privilege against selfincrimination—with its attendant limits on the compelled production of documents—would
cover institutions as well as individuals.” Stuntz, supra note 54, at 427. If the privilege, circa
1906, would have protected a corporation, as Stuntz argues, then a fortiori it would have
protected a real person like Christopher Columbus Wilson or Randy Braswell.
468
Wilson, 221 U.S. at 386.
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Wigmore’s endorsement of the common law privilege) because it was at odds
with the result the Court wanted. But the upshot has had long-term consequences
for individual freedom: today some Americans have less Fifth Amendment
protection “than they enjoyed under the common law of the eighteenth
century.”469 Justices preferring an originalist approach to the Fifth Amendment
should reject the collective entity rule as it applies to real persons because it is
at odds with the common law roots of the privilege.470
C.

The Court’s Waiver Theory Is Pure Legal Fiction

Wilson’s dismissal of the common law privilege was not the most
wrongheaded aspect of the opinion. Worse was the Court’s embrace of a waiver
theory to deny Wilson’s Fifth Amendment claim. Wilson was decided five years
after Hale, which ruled that a corporate officer could not invoke the Fifth on
behalf of a corporation and opined that corporations are not protected by the
Fifth Amendment.471 Hale relied heavily upon a state’s visitorial authority to
inspect corporate documents to deny corporations Fifth Amendment
protection.472
But the visitorial theory could not help the government in Wilson because no
corporation was invoking the Fifth and Wilson was taking the Fifth to protect
himself—not the corporation that employed him. Unwilling to follow common
law principles and concerned that an officer’s taking the Fifth would stymie
prosecution of white-collar crime, Wilson invented a new theory analogous to
the visitorial power to conclude that an officer implicitly waives his right against
self-incrimination when subpoenaed for corporate records. Because corporate
documents are subject to government scrutiny, the Court declared that “the
custodian has voluntarily assumed a duty which overrides his claim of
privilege.”473
This legal principle was created out of thin air. At the time Wilson was
decided, no case interpreting the Fifth Amendment had held that a person waived
469
Nagareda, supra note 82, at 1577. Professor Nagareda’s statement was directed at the
larger issue of the Court’s treatment of self-incriminatory documents generally. See id. (“The
origin of the Court’s error lies in its treatment of self-incriminatory documents.”). But his
point equally applies to a corporate officer being compelled to disclose corporate documents
that are personally incriminating.
470
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting
act of production doctrine as currently interpreted “may be inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Fifth Amendment[],” indicating willingness to reconsider scope and meaning
of doctrine under Fifth Amendment); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (expressing view that, as “originally understood,” privilege was
meant to protect a person from being compelled to disclose potentially incriminating
evidence, and thus current doctrine, which protects only compelled testimony, may be
inconsistent with original intent of Framers).
471
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
472
Id. at 75.
473
Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380.
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the privilege by taking a job. To be sure, courts prior to Wilson did rule that one
could waive a constitutional right, including the privilege.474 But none found an
implicit waiver upon the formation of an employer-employee relationship.
Thirty-three years later, and without providing any additional legal support,
White extended Wilson’s implied waiver rule to all persons who work for or join
a collective entity.475
Think about the impact of Wilson and White for a moment. Subpoenas can be
served on “secretaries, clerks, tellers, cashiers, and other employees or members
who do not expect to assume personally the entity’s responsibility for producing
its records.”476 Hence, all employees or members of a collective entity—not just
CEOs—have no Fifth Amendment protection when served with a subpoena.477
As a legal theory, Wilson’s implied waiver rule had no more support in theory
than it did in legal precedent. First, Wilson never waived the Fifth when he
became president of United Wireless Telegraph Company; rather, the Court later
decreed that he waived his right when he took the job. As Justice Alito has noted,

474
The classic example of waiver of the Fifth is when a defendant takes the stand to testify
in his own criminal trial. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900);
WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2276. But cf. BERGER, supra note 91, at 94 (noting defendant’s
choice to testify obviously constitutes waiver of Fifth Amendment right not to take stand,
“[b]ut it is far less clear whether the defendant’s decision to testify is also a waiver of his Fifth
Amendment right not to respond to specific self-incriminatory questions”). Prior to Wilson,
two additional legal propositions seemed settled regarding waiver of constitutional rights.
First, courts ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination must be asserted, otherwise it
was deemed waived. See, e.g., In re Knickerbocker Steamboat Co., 139 F. 713, 716 (S.D.N.Y.
1905). Related to this first rule, the Court in Brown noted in dicta that “if the witness himself
elects to waive his privilege, . . . and discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted
to stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure.” 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896). Second, courts
found that a course of conduct might be enough to demonstrate an intentional waiver of a
constitutional right. See, e.g., Shepard v. Barron, 194 U.S. 553, 568 (1904).
Shortly after Wilson was decided, the Harvard Law Review endorsed Wilson’s waiver
theory by noting that “one who keeps public or quasi-public records required by law waives
his privilege against self-incrimination to such an extent that he may not lawfully refuse to
produce them.” Recent Cases, 25 HARV. L. REV. 81, 96 (1911-1912). The subpoenaed records
in Wilson were not “public or quasi-public records.” And Wilson’s discussion of “public
records and official documents,” 221 U.S. at 380, was offered to rebut Wilson’s claim that his
physical custody of the incriminating records bolstered his Fifth Amendment defense. The
Wilson Court never intimated that the subpoenaed records were public documents.
475
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
476
King, supra note 52, at 1577 n.179.
477
See Kevin D. Cramer, Back from the Brink: Boyd’s Private Papers Protection and the
Sole Proprietor’s Business Records, 21 AM. BUS. L.J. 367, 373 n.37 (1984) (“Given the ever
increasing number of persons employed by corporations and other forms of organized
business entities, the [collective entity doctrine] significantly curtails the fifth amendment
rights of a large portion of the populace. Moreover, the impact of the [doctrine] on the lives
of these people is quite pervasive because business affairs constitute the bulk of their daily
activities.”).
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“there is no actual waiver but merely an obligation imposed by law.”478 Indeed,
the so-called “waiver” was imposed by the judiciary retroactively “to aid in the
prosecution of individuals involved in an adversarial—not a regulatory—
system.”479 What then-Judge Scalia wrote about a similar waiver argument is
apropos here: “What occur[red in Wilson] is surely no waiver in the ordinary
sense of a known and voluntary relinquishment, but rather merely the product of
the court’s decree that the act entails the consequence—a decree that remains to
be justified.”480 Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce, which was
the basis for prosecuting Wilson, does not include the power to demand
relinquishment of an individual’s Fifth Amendment right in order to hold a
job.481 That’s why we have the Bill of Rights.
Second, the waiver theory proves too much. If the waiver theory works for
compelled production of documents, it also works for compelled oral
testimony.482 So argued the government in Curcio.483 As described above, the
Curcio Court rejected the government’s argument.484 Curcio made a distinction
478
Alito, supra note 47, at 66 n.174. Others share Justice Alito’s view. See Foster, supra
note 54, at 1630 (“[T]he idea that one voluntarily has assumed a duty overriding her
constitutional privilege states a conclusion without providing a reason. The only reason a
person waives the right by taking on duties to a collective entity is because the Supreme Court
has so held in the representative capacity cases.” (footnote omitted)); Mosteller, Simplifying
Subpoena Law, supra note 18, at 61 (stating that “the waiver argument is nothing more than
a rhetorical device used to justify denying the privilege to individuals who hold positions of
responsibility in collective entities on the basis of public necessity”). One commentator,
however, defends the waiver theory. See Arthur Y.D. Ong, Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege
and Compelled Production of Corporate Papers After Fisher and Doe, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
935, 950-59 (1986) (arguing implied waiver rule reflects balance of competing interests and
is correct and necessary to regulate corporate conduct and to promote effective law
enforcement). I agree with another commentator’s conclusion that this “reasoning” is not how
the Court analyzes a waiver of the privilege in a criminal context. See Foster, supra note 54,
at 1630 n.199 (arguing that creating exception based on balancing competing interests is not
the same as recognizing knowing or intentional waiver of privilege).
479
Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law, supra note 18, at 61 n.199.
480
United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). Then-Judge
Scalia’s statement was made in a case where a defendant objected to the rule that he submit
to a mental examination by a government psychiatrist as a precondition to raising an insanity
defense. See id. at 1109. Responding to the government’s argument that the defendant had
“waived” his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by introducing expert
testimony on his mental sanity, Scalia stated that it was “at best a fiction” to conclude that the
defendant had waived the Fifth. Id. at 1113.
481
See Heier, supra note 14, at 100 (noting Congress lacks power “to demand a waiver of
the privilege in return for the right to earn a living. Any attempt to impose such a condition
would appear to be unconstitutional”); see also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500
(1967) (“There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition
by the exaction of a price. Engaging in interstate commerce is one.”).
482
See Alito, supra note 47, at 66 n.174 (“[T]he waiver that is deemed to occur might just
as logically be extended to oral testimony as well as production of documents.”).
483
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 123 (1957).
484
See id. at 124.
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between a custodian’s compelled oral testimony and compelled testimony from
that same custodian pursuant to the act of producing documents. The former is
protected, while the latter is not because the custodian has impliedly waived the
Fifth by accepting a job. Of course, the text of the Fifth Amendment, which
commands no person shall “be a witness against himself,”485 recognizes no such
distinction between different types of compelled testimony. Indeed, the words
of the text prohibit compelling more than oral testimony.486 While a lack of
textual support did not bother the Justices in 1957 when Curcio was decided,
Braswell made no effort to explain why this arbitrary, judge-made distinction is
permitted under the Fifth Amendment.487 “Testimony” should mean the same
thing for all persons under the Fifth Amendment. Astonishingly, on the same
day that Braswell was decided, eight Justices, including the Chief Justice,
“squarely contradicted” the same distinction embraced in Braswell. 488
Worse still, the waiver rule adopted in Wilson (and reaffirmed in Braswell)
cannot be reconciled with the Court’s subsequent precedents on waiver of the
privilege and its rulings that one’s employment status does not diminish the
protection provided by the Fifth Amendment or the ability to invoke it.
485

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Pickholz & Murphy, supra note 54, at 365 (noting right not to “be a witness against
himself” is “broader than mere oral statements”).
487
See Brief for Petitioner Randy Braswell at 37, Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99
(1988) (No. 87-3) (“If a custodian does not waive his right not to condemn himself by giving
testimony regarding records, Curcio, how can that custodian logically be compelled to testify
by producing them, and thus condemn himself in that same fashion.”). Nor does Braswell’s
“agency rationale,” see 487 U.S. at 109-10, explain this dichotomy between different types of
compelled testimony. The Harvard Law Review has written that Braswell’s agency rationale
“is potentially a highly significant innovation” and “a new and much more powerful
rationale.” Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 176-77. According to the Harvard Law Review,
Braswell “departs markedly in the significance” it gives to the custodian’s relationship to the
corporation:
In previous collective entity cases, the “agency theory” was simply the recognition that
an individual who held records in his capacity as corporate custodian had no privacy
interest in them. In Braswell, the “agency theory” is the fiction that an individual’s
production of records held in his capacity as corporate custodian is an act by the
corporation rather than by the individual.
Id. at 177-78. Neither the implied waiver doctrine nor the agency rationale explain why a
custodian can be forced to produce documents that constitute incriminating testimony but
cannot be forced to provide oral testimony.
488
See Grogan, supra note 54, at 732-33 (discussing Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.8 (1988)).
In Doe II, the Court stated that
the Fifth Amendment comes into play “only when the accused is compelled to make a
testimonial communication that is incriminating.” These principles were articulated in
general terms, not as confined to acts. Petitioner has articulated no cogent argument as
to why the “testimonial” requirement should have one meaning in the context of acts,
and another meaning in the context of verbal statements.
Doe II, 487 U.S. at 210 n.8 (citations omitted) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 408 (1976)).
486
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Johnson v. Zerbst,489 decided in 1938, required the government to show the
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” to
prove a defendant had waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.490 Since
then, “the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been”
consistently applied “to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a
criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.”491 Certainly, the Fifth
Amendment is intended, inter alia, to preserve a fair trial.492 More importantly,
the Court has said that “[t]he privilege may be waived in appropriate
circumstances if the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.”493 But the
privilege cannot be proven on “a silent record,”494 which is exactly what the
Wilson Court confronted.
The implied waiver-agency rationale embraced in Wilson and Braswell does
not come close to meeting the knowing and voluntary waiver test.495 Indeed, the
Court has never suggested, let alone held, that the implied waiver-agency
rationale of Wilson and Braswell satisfies that test.
D.

Precedents: The Collective Entity Rule Contradicts a Long Line of Cases
Holding That One’s Occupation Does Not Undermine the Right to Take
the Fifth

Furthermore, the Court has also ruled in a string of cases that one’s work
status does not diminish a person’s right to invoke the Fifth. Although not
decided as a Fifth Amendment case, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of
New York City,496 built the constitutional framework for future rulings involving
the privilege.497 Harry Slochower, a tenured professor at Brooklyn College, was
summarily discharged after he took the Fifth when questioned about his past
489

304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. at 464.
491
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973).
492
See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 385 (2010) (stating that Court has applied Zerbst test to waiver of
one’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
493
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968).
494
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
495
Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, Compulsion, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 889, 956 (2017) (“Under
traditional principles of waiver, to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination, an individual must be told only of the existence of the right to
be waived—a right to remain silent—and the consequences of a waiver—that anything the
individual says if he chooses to speak can be used to incriminate.”); Note, Testimonial Waiver
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1765 (1979) (noting
generally, advance waiver requires knowledge of waiver and freedom from compulsion,
“while contemporaneous waiver may not require knowledge” and “[s]ome rights, however,
may not be relinquished by advance agreement, and others require knowledge that the right
is being waived even for a contemporaneous waiver” (footnote omitted)).
496
350 U.S. 551 (1956).
497
Id. at 557 (reasoning the privilege would be meaningless if it could be taken as
equivalent to confession of guilt or presumption of perjury).
490

1598

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1523

membership in the Communist Party during a Senate Subcommittee inquiry on
subversive influences in the American education system.498 Section 903 of the
Charter of the City of New York authorized termination of a city employee’s job
whenever the employee invoked the Fifth to avoid answering questions related
to his official conduct.499 New York’s highest court upheld Slochower’s
termination by the Board of Education because the law merely imposed a
condition on public employment.500 The Court disagreed and ruled that, under
the facts, “summary dismissal of [Slochower] violate[d] due process of law.”501
Slochower explained that the practical effect of Section 903 is “to discharge
every city employee who invokes the Fifth Amendment.”502 In Slochower’s
case, the Board of Education did not undertake an individualized inquiry as to
the reasons for Slochower’s invocation or show why his taking the Fifth
interfered with the legitimate interests of the Board.503 Under these
circumstances, automatic dismissal was arbitrary and a violation of due process.
While the Fifth Amendment was not the basis for Slochower’s holding, it
loomed large in the Court’s reasoning.504 The Court strongly objected to “the
practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise of a person’s
constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment.”505 Slochower’s summary
dismissal was arbitrary because the Board used his invocation of the privilege
as “a conclusive presumption of guilt.”506 Because the record did not support
such a finding, and because the Board could not claim that it was seeking
information relevant to Slochower’s qualifications to be a professor, “the
discharge falls of its own weight as wholly without support.”507 Finally, the
Court remarked that Section 903 affects all city employees “who exercise their

498

Id. at 553.
Id. at 552.
500
Id. at 557.
501
Id. at 559. For an informative study of the anti-communist purges of the mid-twentieth
century and the Court’s role in protecting (and sometimes not protecting) the constitutional
rights of teachers and professors, see generally MARJORIE HEINS, PRIESTS OF OUR
DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE
(2013).
502
Slochower, 350 U.S. at 558.
503
Id. (“No consideration is given to such factors as the subject matter of the questions,
remoteness of the period to which they are directed, or justification for exercise of the
privilege.”).
504
In Garrity v. New Jersey, Justice Douglas mischaracterized Slochower’s holding when
he wrote: “We held in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, that a public school
teacher could not be discharged merely because he had invoked the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when questioned by a congressional committee . . . .” 385
U.S. 493, 499 (1967).
505
Slochower, 350 U.S. at 557.
506
Id. at 559.
507
Id.
499
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constitutional privilege, the full enjoyment of which every person is entitled to
receive.”508
Though Slochower did not discuss waiver of the privilege, it did demonstrate
that a person does not lose Fifth Amendment protection by taking a
governmental job. The logic of Slochower was extended to lawyers eleven years
later, but only after the Court overruled Cohen v. Hurley,509 which had embraced
reasoning similar to Wilson and its progeny. Albert Martin Cohen, a New York
lawyer, relying on the privilege,510 refused to answer questions during a state
judicial inquiry on “ambulance chasing” and professional misconduct.511
Because he refused to testify, Cohen was disbarred.512 New York’s highest court
upheld Cohen’s disbarment.513 Replying to Cohen’s claim that disbarment for
invoking the privilege denied lawyers a right that is enjoyed by all other citizens,
the New York court explained that Cohen’s status as a lawyer put him in
“another quite different capacity” before the judicial inquiry.514 In his “capacity”
as a lawyer, Cohen could not invoke the rights enjoyed by other citizens.515
When his case reached the Court, Cohen insisted that New York had adopted a
“pernicious doctrine” that deprived lawyers of the right to invoke the privilege
that is given to all other persons.516
In a five-four decision, the Court ruled that Cohen’s disbarment, under the
circumstances, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.517 Justice Harlan’s
majority opinion found that New York’s disbarment of an attorney for invoking
the privilege during a legitimate inquiry authorized by the State’s supervisory
powers over attorneys was constitutionally permissible.518 Justice Harlan denied
that the Court’s result deprived lawyers of “constitutional rights assured to
others.”519 Instead, the Court was only deciding “what process is constitutionally
due them in such circumstances.”520
While Justice Harlan claimed that his ruling was limited, affirming the result
below was taking a page from Wilson’s waiver theory. Like Congress’s power
508

Id. at 558.
366 U.S. 117 (1961).
510
Cohen relied on his state privilege against self-incrimination in the New York state
courts. Id. at 118. Interestingly, Cohen also initially claimed a federal privilege not to testify
but in later proceedings relied solely on “the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed
to all persons, lawyers or laymen alike, under . . . the New York State Constitution.” Id. at
118 n.1.
511
Id. at 119-20.
512
Id. at 122.
513
In re Cohen, 166 N.E. 2d 672, 677 (N.Y. 1960).
514
Id. at 675.
515
See id.
516
Cohen, 366 U.S. at 129.
517
Id. at 129-31.
518
See id.
519
Id. at 129-30.
520
Id. at 129.
509
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to regulate interstate commerce, New York had a plenary power to regulate
lawyers. And just as the “reserved power of visitation would be seriously
embarrassed, if not wholly defeated in its effective exercise, if guilty officers
could refuse inspection of the records and papers of the corporation,”521 so too
where illegal or shady practices on the part of some lawyers are suspected,
New York could rationally conclude that the profession itself need not be
subjected to the disrespect which would result from the publicity, delay,
and possible ineffectiveness in their exposure and eradication that might
follow could miscreants only be dealt with through ordinary investigator
and prosecutorial processes.522
This reasoning paralleled Wilson’s waiver theory. Wilson was denied the right
to invoke the privilege because he was president of the corporation and held
corporate documents in that “capacity.”523 By assuming that role, he “voluntarily
assumed a duty which overrides his claim of privilege.”524 Likewise, Cohen was
denied the privilege in his “capacity” as a member of the bar. Admission to the
bar constituted an implied waiver of a lawyer’s Fifth Amendment right—at least
in professional disciplinary hearings.
Although his dissent never cited Wilson or its implied waiver theory, Justice
Black argued that “the theory adopted by the court below and reaffirmed by the
majority here is that lawyers may be separated into a special group upon which
special burdens can be imposed even though such burdens are not and cannot be
placed upon other groups.”525 Justice Black insisted that the Court had endorsed
“a practice based upon the artificial notion that rights and privileges can be
stripped from a man in his capacity as a lawyer without affecting the rights and
privileges of that man as a man.”526 And Justice Douglas’s dissent, after
referencing examples where Presidents Andrew Jackson and Ulysses Grant
invoked the Fifth in response to Congressional inquiries, asserted that “[t]here
is no exception in the Fifth Amendment for lawyers any more than there is for
professors, Presidents or other office holders.”527
Six years later, and after the Fifth Amendment had been formally applied to
the States,528 the dissenters in Cohen spoke for a plurality of the Court in Spevack
v. Klein,529 a case that was “practically on all fours with” Cohen.530 Samuel
Spevack, a New York lawyer, was disbarred after he invoked the privilege and
521

Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911).
Cohen, 366 U.S. at 127.
523
Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380.
524
Id.
525
Cohen, 366 U.S. at 136 (Black, J., dissenting).
526
Id. at 145.
527
Id. at 153 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
528
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964).
529
385 U.S. 511 (1967).
530
Id. at 513.
522
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refused to honor a subpoena requiring him to produce his financial documents
and testify at an inquiry on professional misconduct.531 Justice Douglas’s
plurality opinion found that New York had utilized impermissible compulsion
when it threatened Spevack with disbarment for invoking the privilege, and
overruled Cohen v. Hurley.532 Justice Douglas pointedly noted: “We find no
room in the privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so
as to deny it to some and extend it to others.”533 He also noted that “[l]awyers
are not excepted from the words” of the Fifth Amendment, “and we can imply
no exception.”534
Spevack was a companion case to Garrity v. New Jersey.535 In Garrity, police
officers in two New Jersey boroughs were investigated for fixing traffic
tickets.536 Before being questioned at a judicial hearing, the officers were warned
that anything they said could be used against them in a subsequent criminal
prosecution and that they had a right to refuse to answer incriminating questions,
but if they refused to answer, they would be removed from their jobs.537 The
officers answered the questions, and their statements were later used against
them in criminal prosecutions.538 Garrity held that the Fourteenth Amendment
bars “use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat
of removal from office.”539 Confirming what he said for the Spevack plurality,
Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Garrity stated, “[P]olicemen, like teachers
and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional
rights.”540 Justice Harlan’s dissent, employing a balancing analysis, took the
position that an officer’s right to invoke the Fifth had to be weighed against “the
protection of other important values” asserted by the state.541 Without saying so
directly, the dissent took the position that a state could condition the job of a
police officer upon the waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.542
531

Id. at 512.
Id. at 516. Justice Fortas provided the fifth vote for overruling Cohen. Id. at 519-20
(Fortas, J., concurring).
533
Id. at 516 (majority opinion).
534
Id.
535
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
536
Id. at 494.
537
Id.
538
Id. at 495.
539
Id. at 500.
540
Id.
541
Id. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
542
See id. at 509 n.3 (“[T]hey had a constitutional right to refuse to answer under the
circumstances, but . . . they had no constitutional right to remain police officers in the face of
their clear violation of the duty imposed upon them.” (second alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., concurring))); see Peter
Westen, Answer Self-Incriminating Questions or Be Fired, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 103 (2010)
(describing Justice Harlan’s dissent as “asserting with considerable force that employment as
532
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Spevack and Garrity were the start of the so-called “penalty cases” where the
Court upheld Fifth Amendment claims of persons licensed by the State like
lawyers and architects, government employees, and political office holders who
were threatened with loss of employment and other government benefits for
invoking the privilege.543 By 1977, Justice White, who had dissented in Spevack,
spoke for the Court in Lefkowitz v. Turley and explained: “The object of the
[Fifth] Amendment ‘was to insure that a person should not be compelled, when
acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to
show that he himself had committed a crime.’”544 This principle “reflected the
settled view” of the Court.545 Accordingly, there was “no room for urging that
the Fifth Amendment privilege is inapplicable simply because the issue
arises . . . in the context of official inquiries into the job performance of a public
contractor.”546
Starting with Slochower and continuing through the “penalty cases,” the
Court’s Fifth Amendment doctrine outside of the collective entity rule has
unmistakably established that one’s occupational status does not diminish the
protection provided by the Fifth Amendment or the ability to invoke it. But the
collective entity rule says just the opposite: a person can be denied Fifth
Amendment protection because he works for or is a member of an artificial
entity.547 What Justice White said about the Fifth Amendment in Turley is
a police officer may lawfully be conditioned upon an officer’s foregoing his Fifth Amendment
rights”).
543
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496-98 (police officers); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 512-20
(1967) (attorneys); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276-79 (1968) (police officers);
Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 280-85 (1968)
(sanitation workers); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79-84 (1973) (public contractors);
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977) (officers of political parties). While
the current Court has not signaled disagreement with Garrity and its progeny, the cases have
not escaped academic criticism. See Westen, supra note 542, at 138-45 (arguing cases are
internally inconsistent, at odds with subsequent Court rulings, and Garrity has been silently
overruled by later rulings); Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers
and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1381-82 (2001) (criticizing reasoning of
Garrity, but not calling for it to be overruled); Amar & Lettow, supra note 49, at 868-69, 90506 (1995) (urging that Garrity be overruled); R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 68 (1981) (calling Garrity and its progeny
“wrong in their conception of the nature of the privilege”); Friendly, supra note 49, at 706-07
(stating after Garrity, Spevack, Gardner, and Uniformed Sanitation Men, “[i]t is impossible
to derive any unifying principle from them; the Court seems to acting ad hoc”); Robert B.
McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 200 (describing
Garrity and Spevack as “the most illuminating and, at the same time, the most inscrutable of
the recent cases dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination”).
544
Turley, 414 U.S. at 77 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)).
545
Id.
546
Id. at 78.
547
See Foster, supra note 54, at 1632 (“The representative capacity doctrine is inconsistent
with the principle that the government may not impose economic sanctions for exercising fifth
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equally true for a custodian of a collective entity: if there is “no room for urging
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is inapplicable”548 for professors, lawyers,
police officers, architects, and political office holders “in the context of official
inquiries into [their] job performance,”549 then the Fifth should also apply to
custodians of collective entities in that context. Put simply, “[t]here is no
exception in the Fifth Amendment for [custodians of collective entities] any
more than there is for professors, Presidents, or other office holders.”550
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that Randy Braswell and Webster Hubbell are “person[s]”
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Both were targets of criminal
investigations and received subpoenas calling for the production of their
business records. Under current Fifth Amendment doctrine, Randy Braswell was
denied constitutional protection “because he chose to operate his business as a
wholly owned corporation while Webster Hubbell retains his privilege (and
avoids prosecution) because he operated his business as a sole proprietor.”551
amendment rights. Its effect is to hold that merely by taking a job with a collective entity, a
person waives her privilege with respect to any implied testimonial communications in the
act of producing documents. In order to avoid losing the privilege, a person would have to
refuse any employment or other association with a collective entity.”); Price, supra note 54,
at 381 (noting Randy Braswell’s inability to invoke the Fifth “is directly attributable to his
status as custodian of the corporations’ records” so “Braswell’s status as custodian of
corporate records overrode his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination”).
548
Turley, 414 U.S. at 78.
549
Id.
550
See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 153 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Moreover, as
Professor Mosteller has already documented, Wilson’s waiver theory is also inconsistent with
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law, supra
note 18, at 60-61 (describing how Marchetti refused to accept government’s waiver
argument). The defendant in Marchetti raised a Fifth Amendment objection to a federal law
that required gamblers to register with the federal government and pay an annual occupation
tax. Marchetti, 390 at 40-41. An earlier case, Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955),
had rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge to the registration and tax requirements on the
theory that a gambler has a choice not to gamble and by choosing to do so, presumably, waives
his privilege not to incriminate himself. Id. at 423. Marchetti found this reasoning “no longer
persuasive”:
[I]f such an inference of antecedent choice were alone enough to abrogate the privilege’s
protection, it would be excluded from the situations in which it has historically been
guaranteed, and withheld from those who most require it. Such inferences, bottomed on
what must ordinarily be a fiction, have precisely the infirmities which the Court has
found in other circumstances in which implied or uninformed waivers of the privilege
have been said to have occurred. To give credence to such “waivers” without the most
deliberate examination of the circumstances surrounding them would ultimately license
widespread erosion of the privilege through “ingeniously drawn legislation.”
Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51-52 (citations omitted) (quoting E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1949)).
551
Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 107.
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Professor Cole was dead-on when he described this result as “untenable,”
especially because “those who form limited liability entities neither know nor
intend that their actions constitute a waiver of a fundamental constitutional
right.”552 But the collective entity doctrine is bad constitutional law for other
reasons as well. Custodians of collective entities are “person[s]” under Fifth
Amendment, yet they are denied constitutional protection because of their job
status. That result cannot be squared with the text of the amendment which
makes no exceptions for the “person[s]” it protects—and certainly makes no
exceptions based on one’s occupation.
The collective entity doctrine is also inconsistent with the common law
protection afforded custodians and representatives of artificial entities. There is
no dispute among legal commentators and judges that the common law
understanding of the privilege permitted custodians to invoke the privilege when
summoned to produce entity records that were incriminating.
Denying custodians their Fifth Amendment rights has also been justified
because they impliedly waive their right upon assuming the job, but the waiver
theory only goes so far. Custodians waive the privilege for incriminating
testimony derived from the act of producing records, but not when compelled to
provide oral testimony. This is legal gobbledygook. As Justice Kennedy states
in his dissenting opinion in Braswell, “There is no basis in the text or history of
the Fifth Amendment for such a distinction. The Self-Incrimination Clause
speaks of compelled ‘testimony,’ and has always been understood to apply to
testimony in all its forms.”553
Most recently, the Court has stripped custodians of their privilege because
they are not really incriminating themselves when they respond to a subpoena
and communicate incriminating information about the existence, custody, and
authenticity of entity documents. Rather it is the corporate entity that is
communicating the incriminating testimony. Like the implied waiver theory, this
is a legal fiction, which L.L. Fuller famously described as “either, (1) a statement
propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false
statement recognized as having utility.”554 The utility here is removing obstacles
in order to prosecute white-collar crime. This type of reasoning should play no
part in the interpretation of a fundamental right.
Finally, the collective entity doctrine contradicts a line of cases originating in
the 1950s that unequivocally hold that one’s employment or occupational status
does not diminish the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment or the ability
to invoke it. Under the collective entity rule, however, a person can be denied
Fifth Amendment protection simply because they work for or are a member of
an artificial entity.555
552
553
554
555

Id.
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (1930).
The Department of Justice defends this result, in part, because folks like Randy
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Professor Cole has urged litigants to challenge the collective entity rule “at
each and every opportunity in any case involving a fact pattern that is not
indisputably governed by controlling precedent.”556 I agree. And the Court
should reconsider and repeal the rule for the reasons described above. Indeed,
the Court may soon have an opportunity to do so. The federal circuit courts are
split on Braswell’s applicability to former employees of artificial entities.557
Also, Braswell left open whether its reasoning “supports compelling a custodian
to produce corporate records when the custodian is able to establish, by showing
for example that he is the sole employee and officer of the corporation, that the
jury would inevitably conclude that he produced the records.”558 Of course, in
light of the facts in Braswell, it is fair to ask if Randy Braswell “did not qualify
for this [potential] exception, who could?”559
Braswell had “notice that incorporating his business constituted an implied waiver of the right
to protect business documents from disclosure” as a result of “decades of settled precedent
from th[e] Court.” Brief for the United States, supra note 415, at 33 n.22. If the government’s
position were sound, then the results in Slochower and the other “penalty cases” were wrong
because the challengers in those cases also had statutory notice that invoking the Fifth would
result in termination from government employment or other government benefits. Worse still,
under the government’s view of the Fifth Amendment, jurisdictions nationwide are
encouraged to enact laws similar to the law invalidated in Slochower providing that when
federal, state, or local employees invoke the Fifth when questioned about conduct relating to
their official duties, their employment shall be terminated. Although a person “has no
constitutional right to be a policeman,” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(Mass. 1892), the Court has rejected—except in the collective entity doctrine—the view that
the Fifth Amendment permits exceptions to its scope based on job status.
556
Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 108.
557
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have held or stated that Braswell’s collective
entity theory is not applicable to former employees, while the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have
held the opposite. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983
and June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d 981, 986-87 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding collective entity theory does
not apply to former employee because “once the officer leaves the company’s employ . . . he
no longer acts as a corporate representative but functions in an individual capacity in his
possession of corporate records”), United States v. McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 133 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1997) (“[A] former employee . . . who produces purloined corporate documents is
obviously not within the scope of the Braswell rule.”), and In re Grand Jury Proc., 71 F.3d
723, 724 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[This court] follows the Second Circuit[] . . . and holds that the
collective entity rule does not apply to a former employee of a collective entity who is no
longer acting on behalf of the collective entity.”), with In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov.
12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 1992) (“We hold that a custodian of corporate records
continues to hold them in a representative capacity even after his employment is terminated.
It is the immutable character of the records as corporate which requires their production and
which dictates that they are held in a representative capacity.”), and In re Sealed Case (Gov’t
Recs.), 950 F.2d 736, 739-41 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that whether collective entity theory
applies “turns less on the ownership of the [document] than on its use”).
558
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 n.11.
559
Lathrop, supra note 47, at 578. The fact that Braswell expressly left open whether the
collective entity rule would apply to a custodian who is the sole employee and officer of the
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In sum, the Court should dispatch the collective entity rule.560 Custodians and
representatives of artificial entities should be able to invoke the Fifth when
compelled to disclose entity records “pursuant to a subpoena [that] causes [them]
to make testimonial admissions that are incriminating”561—just like other
individuals would do. The Court’s frequently repeated claim that without the
collective entity rule law enforcement would suffer is constitutionally irrelevant.
The Fifth Amendment “is not concerned with the substantive results of trials—
that is, whether or not guilt is established. Hence, the fact that a broadening of
the privilege might make prosecution more difficult should be of little, if any
relevance.”562 By jettisoning the collective entity rule, the Court would restore
to custodians the same right that all other persons possess under the Fifth
Amendment.

company places form over substance and indicates that “the Court was willing to determine
the availability of a custodian’s fifth amendment privilege based on whether the custodian
had a secretary, or had appointed two figure-head co-officers.” Grogan, supra note 54, at 727.
Moreover, “[t]he reasoning of Braswell is also potentially applicable to single-member
LLCs, and some courts have already applied it to such LLCs. Whether or not Braswell’s
reasoning should be applied to a single-member LLC is by no means an open-and-shut case,
however.” Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 85 (footnote omitted).
Finally, another potential issue concerns Braswell’s requirement that the government
“make no evidentiary use of the ‘individual’s act’ [of production] against the individual.
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118. Does this judge-made rule “proscribe derivative as well as direct
evidentiary use of the act of production?” Lathrop, supra note 47, at 578.
560
See Cole, Limited Liability Entities, supra note 20, at 107-08 (noting that “[t]he world
of business entity formation has changed dramatically” since Braswell was decided, and the
way “business entities are subjected to the criminal justice system has been transformed” as
well—for these reasons and others, “the collective entity doctrine should be abandoned”).
561
King, supra note 52, at 1546 (footnote omitted).
562
Organizational Papers, supra note 52, at 652.

